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ASSESSING THE WISDOM OF THE BUSINESS
JUDGMENT RULE IN CORPORATE CONTROL




In 1961, you were elected to the board of directors of
HealthCo, a multi-million dollar pharmaceutical company. The
president of HealthCo was your college roommate. Despite in-
creased competition in the industry and long delays in obtaining
FDA approval to sell new products, you remain confident in
HealthCo's management and in its future. Rather than focusing
on short-term earnings per share and paying a large portion of
HealthCo's earnings to the shareholders as dividends, the com-
pany has reinvested HealthCo's earnings into long-term research
and development (R&D) efforts seeking to ensure the company's
growth and success into the next century. The history of margi-
nal earnings and modest dividends has caused the company's
stock price to languish between $30 and $35 per share over the
last two years.
Today, the company received an unsolicited offer from a
well-known corporate takeover artist to purchase all of the com-
pany's shares for $55 cash per share. Your investment banker
has advised defending against this unsolicited offer because the
takeover offer will saddle HealthCo with massive debt-payment
of which could threaten the company's ongoing R&D efforts.
You like the defense plan proposed by the bankers, but are con-
cerned that the cost of the plan is expected to exceed ten million
dollars. In addition, HealthCo has exhausted its credit opportu-
nities and will be forced to finance the proposed defense plan
with junk bonds. Without the defense plan, the company will be
"taken over" and the current management and the board of di-
rectors will be ousted.
As a director, you owe fiduciary duties to the company's
shareholders and have an obligation to maximize the value of
their investment. However, you are concerned with retaining
your position on the board and with the future of the company's
current management and employees. Moreover, if you defend
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against the takeover, the company's shareholders may sue you
for denying them the $55 per share price. What do you do?
Legislatures and courts entrust directors with substantial deference
premised on the belief that directors are experts in business management
and are therefore better suited than judges to make corporate decisions.1
In spite of their expertise, directors do not always make the best decisions
for the corporation or its shareholders. Directors may have a financial or
other interest in the outcome of their decision which conflicts with the
best interests of the corporation or its shareholders.2 A conflict between
director and shareholder interests is most likely to arise when a corpora-
tion is faced with an unwanted takeover.3 On one hand, directors have
fiduciary duties to the company's shareholders, 4 who have a short-term
interest in maximizing the value of their shares.5 On the other hand,
directors may have a duty to consider the long-term interests of the com-
pany. Directors may also have social and professional relationships
with the corporation's management,7 and may be tempted to thwart a
1. See, eg., Edelman v. Fruehauf Corp., 798 F.2d 882, 888 (6th Cir. 1986) (corporate
directors "know more about running their businesses than courts do"); Minstar Acquiring
Corp. v. AMF Inc., 621 F. Supp. 1252, 1259 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) ("Courts have no place substi-
tuting their judgments for that of the directors."); Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Levien, 280 A.2d 717,
720 (Del. 1971) (When board of directors uses sound business judgment, "[a] court... will not
substitute its own notions of what is or is not sound business judgment."); Solash v. Telex
Corp., [1988-1989 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) % 93,608, at 97,727 (Del. Ch. Jan.
19, 1988) ("Because businessmen and women are correctly perceived as possessing skills, infor-
mation and judgment not possessed by reviewing courts[,]... courts have long been reluctant
to second-guess such decisions when they appear to have been made in good faith."). See also
infra notes 39-54 and accompanying text for a discussion of the rationale behind the business
judgment rule.
2. See, e.g., Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, 506 A.2d 173, 184 (Del.
1986) (business judgment rule protection not afforded where "[t]he principle benefit [of the
board decision] went to directors, who avoided personal liability").
3. Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 954 (Del. 1985). When faced
with a takeover bid, there is an "omnipresent specter that a board may be acting primarily in
its own interests." Id. See also infra notes 418-40 and accompanying text for a discussion of
why business judgment rule protection, therefore, may be inappropriate in control contexts.
4. See, e.g., Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 872 (Del. 1985). See also infra notes
22-37 and accompanying text for a discussion of directors' fiduciary duties.
5. Revlon, 506 A.2d at 182.
6. See Paramount Communications, Inc. v. Time Inc., [1989 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec.
L. Rep. (CCH) % 94,514, at 93,281-82 (Del. Ch. July 14, 1989), aff'd, No. 284, 1989 (Del. Feb.
26, 1990). See also infra notes 382-417 and accompanying text.
7. Although corporate law grants shareholders the power to elect corporate directors, in
practice, management nominates directors and shareholders ratify management's selections.
W. KNEPPER & D. BAILEY, LIABILITY OF CORPORATE OFFICERS AND DIRECTORS 4 (1988).
Besides maintaining social and professional relationships with management, directors may be
part of the company's inside management. H. HENN & J. ALEXANDER, LAWS OF CORPORA-
TIONS AND OTHER BUSINESS ENTERPRISES 553 (1983).
BUSINESS JUDGMENT RULE
takeover in order to entrench current management and themselves.'
The business judgment rule is a convenient doctrine to keep corpo-
rate decision making out of the courtroom.9 In general, the business
judgment rule provides that courts will not second guess informed deci-
sions made by boards of directors absent a showing of "gross and palpa-
ble overreaching." 10 Besides protecting board decisions from judicial
review, the business judgment rule also insulates directors from personal
liability. 1 The rule recognizes the directors' important role in overseeing
company operations and protects and promotes the full and free exercise
of directors' managerial power 2 despite the existence of these conflicting
interests.
13
This Comment considers the nature of director responsibilities in
corporate management and the fiduciary duties which attend these re-
sponsibilities. Next, the Comment analyzes the theory and development
of the business judgment rule as applied to contests for corporate control.
The Comment then discusses some problems with allowing the business
judgment rule to protect directors' corporate control decisions. Finally,
the author concludes that increased director accountability is needed to
protect shareholders, and proposes a legislative solution which transfers
the power to make corporate control decisions to shareholders.
II. BACKGROUND OF DIRECTORS' FIDUCIARY DUTIES AND THE
BUSINESS JUDGMENT RULE
A. Corporate Control and Fiduciary Duties
The fundamental structure of corporate governance divides manage-
8. See, eg., Robert M. Bass Group, Inc. v. Evans, 552 A.2d 1227, 1244 (Del. Ch. 1988)
(directors' plan unreasonable because it "tend[ed] to entrench the management group and vir-
tually eliminate the public shareholders' opportunity to realize a 'takeover premium' for their
shares"). See also infra notes 418-40 and accompanying text.
9. See Norlin Corp. v. Rooney, Pace Inc., 744 F.2d 255, 264 (2d Cir. 1984).
10. See, e.g., Sinclair, 280 A.2d at 720; Getty Oil Co. v. Skelly Oil Co., 267 A.2d 883, 887
(Del. 1970). See also Responsibilities of Corporate Officers and Directors Under Federal Securi-
ties Laws, Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) No. 1291, at 78 (June 22, 1988).
11. Some commentators distinguish the business judgment rule from the business judg-
ment doctrine, the former protecting directors from personal liability and the latter protecting
decisions made by directors. Courts, at least in the takeover context, do not. See, e.g., Revlon,
506 A.2d at 180 n.10 ("In the transactional justification cases, where the doctrine is said to
apply, our decisions have not observed the distinction in such terminology" between the busi-
ness judgment rule and the business judgment doctrine). Further consideration of this distinc-
tion is outside the scope of this Comment. For additional discussion of the distinction, see
Hinsey, Duty of Care: Business Judgment Rule and ALI Corporate Governance, 52 GEo.
WASH. L. REV. 609, 611-13 (1984).
12. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d at 872; Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984).
13. Pogostin v. Rice, 480 A.2d 619, 627 (Del. 1984).
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ment powers between shareholders, company officers and a board of di-
rectors. 14 State corporate law defines the respective rights and
responsibilities of shareholders, officers and directors."5  Shareholders
own the corporation.16 However, their power to participate in corporate
management and control is limited to decisions affecting the corpora-
tion's "ultimate destiny."17 These types of decisions include the power to
(1) approve or remove directors,18 (2) make amendments to articles of
incorporation or corporate bylaws, and (3) approve or disapprove funda-
mental corporate changes not in the regular course of business.19
Directors, not shareholders, are responsible for managing the busi-
ness and affairs of a corporation .2  Although directors delegate daily op-
erating responsibility to company officers, the board of directors
monitors the performance of company management and establishes
broad company policies.21 Accompanying their powers of management,
directors have fiduciary obligations to the corporation and its sharehold-
ers under both common law and state statutes. 2  These fiduciary duties
include the duty of care and the duty of loyalty. 3
14. Norlin Corp. v. Rooney, Pace Inc., 744 F.2d 255, 258 (2d Cir. 1984). See also gener-
ally H. HENN & J. ALEXANDER, supra note 7, at 466-67.
15. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 304 (1971) (law of incorporating
state determines administration of corporation). See also Norlin, 744 F.2d at 264 n.5. This
Comment focuses primarily on common law and Delaware statutory law because a significant
portion of publicly-traded companies are incorporated in Delaware. H. HENN & J. ALEXAN-
DER, supra note 7, at 185 (approximately 40% of companies listed on the New York Stock
Exchange are incorporated in Delaware).
16. H. HENN & J. ALEXANDER, supra note 7, at 486.
17. Norlin, 744 F.2d at 258 ("[D]ecisions affecting a corporation's ultimate destiny are for
the shareholders to make in accordance with democratic procedures.").
18. H. HENN & J. ALEXANDER, supra note 7, at 491. By removing directors, shareholders
can completely change the management and control of the corporation. D. BLOCK & H. PITT,
PROXY CONTESTS 15 (1982).
19. H. HENN & J. ALEXANDER, supra note 7, at 491.
20. See, eg., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a) (1983) ("The business and affairs of every
corporation organized under this chapter shall be managed by or under the direction of a
board of directors .... ); see also REVISED MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT § 8.01(b) (1982)
("All corporate powers shall be exercised by or under the authority of, and the business and
affairs of the corporation shall be managed under the direction of, its board of directors.").
21. W. KNEPPER & D. BAILEY, supra note 7, at 5-7.
22. See Guth v. Loft, Inc., 5 A.2d 503, 510 (Del. 1939); Warden, The Boardroom as a War
Room: The Real World Applications of the Duty of Care and the Duty of Loyalty, 40 Bus.
LAW. 1431, 1431 (1985). See also generally D. BLOCK, N. BARTON & S. RADIN, THE BUsi-
NESS JUDGMENT RULE: FIDUCIARY DUTIES OF CORPORATE DIRECTORS AND OFFICERS 1
(1988). In addition to common-law fiduciary duties, approximately 35 states have codified
mandatory directorial conduct. Id. at 2.
23. D. BLOCK, N. BARTON & S. RADIN, supra note 22, at I. See also infra notes 24-37 for
a discussion of these duties.
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1. Duty of care
The duty of care requires that a director "exercise, in the perform-
ance of his [or her] tasks, the care that a reasonably prudent [director] in
a similar position would use under similar circumstances."24 When act-
ing within this standard of care, a director is shielded from personal lia-
bility, and his or her decision is protected from judicial scrutiny.25
However, the converse is not always true. A director's failure to act rea-
sonably does not necessarily invoke judicial review or impose personal
liability.26 State legislatures disagree over whether the standard for di-
rector liability is one of gross negligence or ordinary negligence.27 Re-
gardless of what standard applies, courts struggle in imposing it
consistently due to the broad and often anomalous protection afforded by
the business judgment rule.2 8
24. Norlin, 744 F.2d at 264. See also Briggs v. Spaulding, 141 U.S. 132, 147 (1981) ("The
degree of care required ... has to be determined in view of all the circumstances."). For
further consideration of possible future trends in directors' responsibilities, see Frankel, Corpo-
rate Director's Duty of Care: The American Law Institute's Project on Corporate Governance,
52 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 705 (1984).
25. D. BLOCK, N. BARTON & S. RADIN, supra note 22, at 28.
26. Id. This is because "the degree of culpability required for the imposition of liability
may be higher than the standard of care." Id.
27. Delaware state law is the most advantageous to directors because liability requires
gross negligence. See, eg., Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 873 (Del. 1985) ("gross
negligence is ... the proper standard for determining whether [directors exercised proper]
business judgment"); Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 n.6 (Del. 1984) ("director liability
is predicated on a standard which is less exacting than simple negligence"). Similarly, Indi-
ana's law imposes director liability only where "breach or failure to perform constitutes willful
misconduct or recklessness." IND. CODE ANN. § 23-1-35-11e(2) (Burns 1986). California's
standard for director conduct, on the other hand, is framed in more rigorous terms than Dela-
ware's or Indiana's because director liability may be based on a showing of ordinary negli-
gence. CAL. CORP. CODE § 309(a) (West 1977) ("A director shall perform the duties of a
director... in good faith ... as an ordinarily prudent person in a like position would use under
similar circumstances."). Furthermore, directors must demonstrate a "compelling business
purpose" for their actions whenever a conflict of interest is shown. Klaus v. Hi-Shear Corp.,
528 F.2d 225, 233-34 (9th Cir. 1975) (interpreting California law). Similar to California, New
York law employs an ordinary negligence standard. N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 717(a) (McKin-
ney Supp. 1989) ("A director shall perform his duties as a director.., in good faith and with
that degree of care which an ordinarily prudent person in a like position would use under
similar circumstances."). See also Hanson Trust PLC v. ML SCM Acquisition, Inc., 781 F.2d
264, 274 (2d Cir. 1986) (applying New York law).
28. The inconsistency in judicial decisions can be readily seen in cases involving the valid-
ity of poison pills, a popular defense mechanism implemented to thwart unwanted takeovers.
See infra note 76 for a description of poison pills and other common defense mechanisms.
Compare Black & Decker Corp. v. American Standard, Inc., 682 F. Supp. 772, 788 (D. Del.
1988) (applying Delaware law) (directors' decision to implement poison pill not protected by
business judgment rule); Grand Metro. PLC v. Pillsbury Co., 558 A.2d 1049, 1060 (Del. Ch.
1988) (same); with Moran v. Household Int'l, Inc., 500 A.2d 1346, 1357 (Del. 1985) (business
judgment rule protected directors' decision to implement poison pill plan).
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2. Duty of loyalty
The duty of loyalty imposes on directors an affirmative duty to pro-
tect the economic interests of shareholders. 29 This duty also prohibits
self-dealing by directors in the course of their relationship with the cor-
poration and its shareholders.30 Directors' duty of loyalty is breached
when a director uses his or her fiduciary position "to promote, advance
or effectuate a transaction ... in which the [director] has a substantial
economic interest."3 For example, a director who buys a valuable cor-
porate subsidiary at a discount from its fair market value and re-sells it
for personal profit has violated the duty of loyalty.32 Additionally, a di-
rector may breach the duty by advancing his or her individual non-eco-
nomic interests.33 This could occur, for example, when a director
"manipulate[s] the internal corporate machinery" to perpetuate his or
her own control over the corporation.34
The underlying purpose of the duty of loyalty is to ensure that the
corporation and its shareholders are treated fairly.35 When a conflict-
laden transaction is unfair, directors may be held personally liable.36
29. See Norlin, 744 F.2d at 264; Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d at 872.
30. Norlin, 744 F.2d at 264.
31. Solash v. Telex Corp., [1987-1988 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 93,608,
at 97,727 (Del. Ch. Jan. 19, 1988). Under Solash, it is irrelevant whether the economic interest
is direct or indirect. Id.
32. W. KNEPPER & D. BAILEY, supra note 7, at 122. Note however, that transactions
such as this could be upheld if the interested director adequately disclosed his or her interest to
all concerned parties. Id. at 83-84. See also Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d at 889 (board action
sustained, notwithstanding board's violation of its duty of care, "if its approval by majority
vote of the shareholders is found to have been based on an informed electorate").
33. W. KNEPPER & D. BAILEY, supra note 7, at 87.
34. Id.
35. The Delaware court in Guth v. Loft, Inc. first articulated the underlying rationale of
the duty of loyalty:
A public policy, existing through the years, and derived from a profound knowledge
of human characteristics and motives, has established a rule that demands of a corpo-
rate officer or director, peremptorily and inexorably, the most scrupulous observance
of his duty .... The rule that requires an undivided and unselfish loyalty to the
corporation demands that there shall be no conflict between duty and self-interest.
5 A.2d 503, 510 (Del. 1939).
Later, the Delaware court elaborated on the requirements of this duty:
There is no "safe harbor" for such divided loyalties in Delaware. When directors of
a Delaware corporation are on both sides of a transaction, they are required to
demonstrate their utmost good faith and the most scrupulous inherent fairness. The
requirement of fairness is unflinching in its demand that where one stands on both
sides of the transaction, he has the burden of establishing its entire fairness, sufficient
to pass the test of careful scrutiny by the courts.
Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 710 (Del. 1983) (citations omitted). See also Norlin,
744 F.2d at 265 ("Once self-dealing or bad faith is demonstrated.., the burden shifts to the
directors to 'prove that the transaction was fair' ...... ") (citation omitted).
36. Cf. Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Levien, 280 A.2d 717, 724 (Del. 1971). In Sinclair, the parent
[Vol. 23:919
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When a director violates his or her duty of loyalty, but the decision none-
theless is "fair" to the company and its shareholders, courts generally
will not invalidate the transaction or impose personal liability on the
directors.37
B. The Business Judgment Rule
This section discusses the underlying rationale of the business judg-
ment rule and its application to changes in corporate control.38
company was held responsible for breaching its duty of loyalty to minority shareholders of one
of its subsidiaries. Id.
37. See REVISED MODEL BusINEss CORP. ACT § 8.3 1(a)(3) (1982) (a conflict-laden trans-
action "is not voidable by the corporation solely because of the director's interest in the trans-
action if. . .the transaction was fair to the corporation"). The Revised Model Business
Corporation Act (RMBCA) "reject[ed] the common law view that all conflict of interest trans-
actions entered into by directors are automatically voidable at the option of the corporation
... ." Id. at § 8.31 comment 1. Under the RMBCA, conflict of interest transactions may arise
if a director has a direct or indirect financial or managerial interest. Id. at § 8.31(b).
See also Burton v. Exxon Corp., 583 F. Supp. 405, 415 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) (applying Dela-
ware law) (When "directors, who control the making of a transaction and its terms, are on
both sides, then the presumption and deference to sound business judgment are no longer
present[,] ... [i]ntrinsic fairness is then the [standard of review]."); Sinclair, 280 A.2d at 723
(once self-dealing was found, court applied "intrinsic fairness standard" and found that parent
corporation failed to prove it acted fairly); In re RJR Nabisco, Inc. Shareholders Litig., [1988-
1989 Transfer Binder] Fed. See. L. Rep. (CCH) 94,194, at 91,709 (Del. Ch. July 17) ("[I]f
the board is financially interested in the transaction, the appropriate form of judicial review is
to place upon the board the burden to establish the entire fairness of the transaction."), appeal
refused mem, 556 A.2d 1070 (Del. 1989); Robert M. Bass Group, Inc. v. Evans, 552 A.2d
1227, 1239 (Del. Ch. 1988) ("[I]f the corporate fiduciaries [stand] on both sides of the transac-
tion... those fiduciaries must establish the transaction's 'entire fairness' ...."); AC Acquisi-
tions Corp. v. Anderson, Clayton & Co., 519 A.2d 103, 111 (Del. Ch. 1986) (when board had
financial interest in its decision, "there is no alternative to a judicial evaluation of the fairness
of the terms of the terms of the transaction'i).
38. Changes in corporate control generally occur in three types of transactions: (1) a ne-
gotiated merger between two companies; (2) a proxy contest, in which shareholders vote be-
tween an outsider and current management in an election; or (3) a tender offer by an outsider
to buy a majority share. 11 S. LORNE, SECURITIES LAW SERIES, ACQUISITIONS AND MERG-
ERS: NEGOTIATED AND CONTESTED TRANSACTIONS §§ 2.09, 3.01, 4.01 (1988). Negotiated
mergers and some tender offers occur in a friendly environment, whereas proxy contests and
most tender offers occur in a hostile environment. Id. at §§ 3.01, 4.01. The business judgment
rule may apply to protect director decisions made in both hostile and friendly environments.
See, eg., Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 956 (Del. 1985) (court protected
management decision to fight hostile tender offer); Paramount Communications, Inc. v. Time
Inc., No. 284, 1989 (Del. Feb. 26, 1990) (court protected management decision to complete
friendly transaction).
A friendly transaction may be preferred to a hostile transaction for reasons including
seller cooperation, minimization of economic and emotional disadvantages characteristic of
hostile transactions, and tax and accounting benefits. S. LORNE, supra, at § 2.01. This Com-
ment focuses on transactions arising in a hostile environment because conflicts between share-
holder and director interests are most apparent when management opposes a proposed
takeover.
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1. The rationale of the business judgment rule
The business judgment rule was initially recognized nearly a century
ago by the Supreme Court of the United States in Briggs v. Spaulding.39
A three-fold policy rationale underlies director protection under the busi-
ness judgment rule.' ° First, the business judgment rule recognizes
human fallibility.41 Business opportunities often require quick deci-
sions,42 and the business judgment rule prevents "Monday-morning
quarterbacking. ' '4 3 Courts appreciate the part-time nature of director-
ships' and the necessary reliance directors place on corporate officers
and outside professionals in making efficient and effective board
decisions."a
Second, the rule allows directors to engage in a certain amount of
risk-taking.4 6 Shareholders generally accept that directors will assume
certain risks on their behalf because anticipated risk is often commensu-
rate with anticipated return on investment.47 Absent the protection af-
forded by the business judgment rule, competent individuals might refuse
to serve as directors,48 and those individuals who do agree to serve as
39. 141 U.S. 132 (1891). In Briggs, the Court ruled to protect directors from personal
liability because the directors acted without bad faith or corrupt motive. Id. at 159.
40. D. BLOCK, N. BARTON & S. RADIN, supra note 22, at 5-11.
41. Id. at 5.
42. W. KNEPPER & D. BAILEY, supra note 7, at 183 ("Business imperatives often call for
quick decisions, inevitably based on less than perfect information.").
43. Id. (quoting Panter v. Marshall Field & Co., 646 F.2d 271, 297 (7th Cir.), cert. denied,
454 U.S. 1092 (1981)).
44. Many directors serve on a part-time basis, and therefore, "generally cannot [com-
pletely] know... the true condition of the affairs of the company." Briggs, 141 U.S. at 162-63.
See also D. BLOCK, N. BARTON & S. RADIN, supra note 22, at 36 (citing a study which con-
cluded that outside directors spend an average of two hours per week conducting their directo-
rial duties); Greene, Recent Tender Offer Developments: On the Edge or Deep In?, 45 OHIO ST.
L.J. 721, 729 (1984).
45. Manning, The Business Judgment Rule and the Director's Duty of Attention: Time for
Reality, 39 Bus. LAW. 1477, 1492-98 (1984). See also DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(e) (1983)
(board members are "fully protected in relying in good faith upon the books of account or
reports made to the corporation by any of its officers, or by an independent certified public
accountant, or by an appraiser .... "). This reliance on third parties, however, will not excuse
a director's failure to reasonably obtain and disseminate relevant information. Manning,
supra, at 1492. See also Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 872 (Del. 1985).
46. W. KNEPPER & D. BAILEY, supra note 7, at 183 ("Corporate directors perform an
entrepreneur's function, which involves encountering risks ....").
47. Joy v. North, 692 F.2d 880, 885-86 (2d Cir. 1982) ("[I]t is very much in the interest of
shareholders that the law not create incentives for overly cautious corporate decisions."), cert.
denied, 660 U.S. 1051 (1983).
48. Arsht, The Business Judgment Rule Revisited, 8 HOFSTRA L. REV. 93, 97 (1979)
("The business judgment rule grew principally from the judicial concern that persons of rea-
son, intellect, and integrity would not [otherwise] serve as directors . . ").
BUSINESS JUDGMENT RULE
directors might be overly cautious.4 9 Because overly cautious decision
making limits the return shareholders ultimately realize, shareholders ac-
cept and expect risk-taking by company directors."
Finally, courts admit they are ill-equipped to evaluate the wisdom of
complex corporate decisions made in the uncertain and competitive busi-
ness environment in which directors are peculiarly qualified. 1 As a con-
sequence, courts are reluctant to impose their hindsight on decisions
made by well-informed business professionals."2 Although initially ap-
plied to protect decisions such as "should we install lights at Wrigley
Field?,"53 the business judgment rule has been expanded to protect al-
most all types of board decisions-including decisions affecting corporate
control. 
54
2. Protection under the business judgment rule
For the business judgment rule to shield directors from liability and
protect directors' decisions from judicial second-guessing, five elements
must be satisfied.5 These elements embody specific requirements of di-
rectors' fiduciary obligations.56 First, directors must affirmatively act57
or make a conscious decision not to act.58 No protection is afforded di-
rector inaction resulting from ignorance59 or abdication of duties.6 0 This
requirement stems from the policy that directors, by virtue of their
49. Joy, 692 F.2d at 886.
50. Id. ("A rule which penalizes the choice of seemingly riskier alternatives thus may not
be in the interest of shareholders generally.").
51. See Solash v. Telex Corp., [1987-1988 Transfer Binder] Fed. See. L. Rep. (CCH)
93,608, at 97,727 (Del. Ch. Jan. 19, 1988).
52. Id.
53. Shlensky v. Wrigley, 95 Ill. App. 2d 173, 180, 237 N.E.2d 776, 781 (1968) (business
judgment rule protected decision by directors of Chicago Cubs not to install lights at Wrigley
Field because "directors[, not judges, were] elected for their business capabilities and
judgment.").
54. Pogostin v. Rice, 480 A.2d 619, 627 (Del. 1984). But see Minstar Acquiring Corp. v.
AMF Inc., 621 F. Supp. 1252, 1259 (S.D.N.Y. 1985). The court noted that the business judg-
ment rule was designed to protect decisions such as "should we buy a new truck today?" and
"should we give Joe a raise?" Id. The court cautioned that defensive tactics "raise a wholly
different set of considerations [because] by their very nature, [defensive tactics] act as a re-
straint on business purposes." Id.
55. D. BLOCK, N. BARTON & S. RADIN, supra note 22, at 12.
56. See supra notes 22-37 and accompanying text for a discussion of directors' fiduciary
duties.
57. D. BLOCK, N. BARTON & S. RADIN, supra note 22, at 12.
58. Id. (directorial action is protected, whereas inaction is not protected "unless it is the
result of a conscious decision not to act"). See also Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 813 (Del.
1984).
59. Rabkin v. Philip A. Hunt Chem. Corp., 547 A.2d 963, 972 (Del. 1986).
60. Aronson, 473 A.2d at 813 & n.7.
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unique expertise, are better suited than judges to make corporate deci-
sions." Directors who fail to act are not satisfying their directorial re-
sponsibilities, and if directors fail to utilize their superior expertise, then
the grounds for judicial deference disappear.
Second, directors must act without any conflict of interest.62 This
element embodies the directors' general duty of loyalty.63 Also, in refus-
ing to second-guess a directorial decision, courts necessarily assume that
the decision resulted from an objective evaluation of all available alterna-
tives. When the outcome of a decision affects personal interests of the
decision maker, the ability of that decision maker to objectively evaluate
alternatives is impaired. 64 Business judgment rule deference, therefore, is
inappropriate when any personal interest affects the director's ability to
exercise his or her business judgment.65
Third, directors must satisfy their duty of care which requires that
directors obtain all reasonably available information necessary for effec-
tive deliberation. 66 Directors' efforts to obtain and consider relevant in-
formation have come under increasing judicial scrutiny in cases involving
corporate control contests.67
Fourth, directors must act in good faith.68 Good faith requires a
genuine belief on the part of directors that actions taken are in the best
61. Solash, [1987-1988 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) V 93,608, at 97,727.
62. D. BLOCK, N. BARTON & S. RADIN, supra note 22, at 13-16. See also Drobbin v.
Nicolet Instrument Corp., 631 F. Supp. 860, 881 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (applying Nevada law)
(business judgment rule protection may be defeated without finding of pecuniary interest if
indirect "entanglements and alliances" impair independence).
63. Norlin Corp. v. Rooney, Pace Inc., 744 F.2d 255, 264 (2d Cir. 1984) (applying Dela-
ware law). See also supra notes 29-37 and accompanying text for a discussion of directors'
duty of loyalty.
64. D. BLOCK, N. BARTON & S. RADIN, supra note 22, at 14 (citing Arsht, The Business
Judgment Rule Revisited, 8 HOFSTRA L. REv. 93, 115 (1979)).
65. See infra notes 418-40 and accompanying text for a discussion of how control decisions
affecting corporate control may impair a director's business judgment.
66. See Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 872-73 (Del. 1985) ("[A] director's duty to
exercise an informed business judgment is in the nature of a duty of care, as distinguished from
a duty of loyalty."). See supra notes 24-28 and accompanying text for a discussion of directors'
duty of care.
67. See, e.g., Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d at 872 (business judgment rule protects only informed
decisions); City Capital Assocs. Ltd. Partnership v. Interco Inc., 551 A.2d 787, 803 (Del. Ch.)
("[A] board may not proceed, consistently with its duty to be informed, without appropriately
considering relevant information relating to alternatives."), appeal dismissed, 556 A.2d 1070
(Del. 1988); In re Fort Howard Corp. Shareholders Litig., No. 9991 (Del. Ch. Aug. 8, 1988)
(LEXIS, States library, Del file) ("It is essential for valid director action that it be taken on an
informed basis.... [Tihe gravity of [a corporate control] transaction places a special burden
upon the directors to make sure that they have a basis for an informed view.").
68. D. BLOCK, N. BARTON & S. RADIN, supra note 22, at 19.
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interests of the corporation and its shareholders.6 9 The good faith re-
quirement, like the absence of conflicting interests embodies the direc-
tors' general duty of loyalty.7" Some courts have expanded the
application of this duty to include director responsibility to non-share-
holder constituencies.71
Finally, directors must respect the wide discretion entrusted to them
and not abuse it.72 This overriding element is sometimes referred to as
the courts' "escape hatch.",73 The escape hatch allows courts to protect
shareholders from truly egregious actions taken in good faith, such as a
conspicuous waste of corporate assets.74
C. Takeover Threats
To allow business judgment rule protection of board decisions, the
board must satisfy each of the five elements discussed above.75 The
business judgment rule may apply to protect director decisions to imple-
ment "defensive tactics" 76 designed to thwart unwanted takeover
69. Id. at 19.
70. W. KNEPPER & D. BAILEY, supra note 7, at 184.
71. See, e.g., Herald Co. v. Seawell, 472 F.2d 1081, 1095 (10th Cir. 1972) (Denver Post is
"quasi-public institution" and therefore has obligations to its employees and to public); Unocal
Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 955 (Del. 1985) (directors may consider non-
shareholder constituencies such as "creditors, customers, employees, and perhaps even the
community generally"). See also infra notes 463-500 and accompanying text for an analysis of
the legitimacy of consideration of non-shareholder constituencies.
72. D. BLOCK, N. BARTON & S. RADIN, supra note 22, at 19-22. This element reflects the
principle underlying the business judgment rule, which allows for errors of judgment but not
for unconscionable and unreasonable acts. Arsht, supra note 48, at 122.
73. West Point-Pepperell, Inc. v. J.P. Stevens &,Co., 542 A.2d 770, 781 n.5 (Del. Ch.
1988).
74. Growbow v. Perot, 539 A.2d 180, 189-92 (Del. 1988) (repurchase of company's stock
at premium over market from dissident shareholder was not "so egregious" as to eliminate
presumption of business judgment protection); but see Gimbel v. Signal Cos., 316 A.2d 599,
610 (court invalidated sale of company subsidiary for inadequate price, noting "[tihere are
limits on the business judgment rule which fall short of intentional or inferred fraudulent mis-
conduct and which are based simply on gross inadequacy of price.") (Del. Ch.), aff'd, 316
A.2d 619 (Del. 1974).
75. D. BLOCK, N. BARTON & S. RADIN, supra note 22, at 12.
76. "Defensive tactics" is the term given to a wide variety of corporate actions which
individually or in combination with others can hinder or effectively preclude a change in man-
agement control. These tactics can be implemented either during "peacetime," when no live
threat is pending, or after a hostile bidder has announced its intentions. GUIDELINES FOR
DIRECTORS: PLANNING FOR AND RESPONDING TO UNSOLICITED TENDER OFFERS 4 (ABA
Comm. on Corp. Laws 1985).
Defensive tactics, labelled with colorful names, have become increasingly inventive in re-
cent years. Some of these tactics require shareholder approval. Id. at 5-8. Others can be
implemented through the unilateral action of boards of directors. Id. at 8. Generally, a share-
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holder vote is required to issue new securities or to change articles of incorporation provisions
regarding voting requirements and terms of directors' service. See id. at 5-8.
Below is a limited list of common defensive measures which are referred to throughout
the remainder of this Comment. For a thorough discussion of defensive tactics, see 1 A.
FLEISCHER, TENDER OFFERS: DEFENSES, RESPONSES, AND PLANNING (1983).
Defensive Tactics Requiring Shareholder Vote
(1) Classified Boards of Directors:
A "classified" board is one on which directors serve for a specified term of years. S.
LORNE, supra note 38, § 3.08[1][a]. The terms of service are staggered so that a bidder seeking
control through a proxy election will not be able to oust the entire board in one election. Id.
Availability of a classified board is subject to state statute. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8,
§ 141(d) (Supp. 1988) (permitting classified boards).
(2) Cumulative Voting Provisions:
Cumulative voting provisions, like classified boards, are subject to corporate charter and
statutory authority. See, eg., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 214 (Supp. 1988) (allows cumulative
voting). Under cumulative voting provisions, each shareholder is entitled to one vote per share
multiplied by the number of directors on the ballot. S. LORNE, supra note 38, at § 3.08[l][b]
n.6. Cumulative voting provisions are said to assure representation of minority shareholders
on the board. CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of Am., 481 U.S.-69, 86 n.11 (1987). Cumulative
voting inhibits takeovers because target shareholders have the ability to concentrate their
shares in voting for directors. S. LORNE, supra note 38, at § 3.08[l][b] n.6. This allows share-
holders to retain some directors, thereby denying insurgents speedy ouster of all opposing
directors.
(3) Shark Repellents:
Among other techniques, shark repellent devices include "supermajority" voting provi-
sions that increase the percentage of shareholders' votes required to approve a merger, and
"fair price" provisions which require a bidder to pay the same price to all shareholders. Re-
sponsibilities of Corporate Officers & Directors Under Federal Securities Laws, supra note 10, at
72-73. Supermajority provisions decrease the likelihood of a takeover because the bidder must
attain a greater percentage of support in order to acquire control. Id. at 73.
Fair-price provisions require a bidder to pay the same price to all shareholders. A.
FLEISCHER, supra, at 33-34. Absent a fair-price provision, bidders can use a two-tier "front-
loaded" bid which typically pays a large cash premium to a majority of shareholders in order
to gain control. Id. at 388.141-.152 (Supp. 1987). Once control is secured, the bidder buys out
"back-end" minority shareholders with a "package" consisting of debt or equity that is typi-
cally high risk. Id. at 388.141-.143. See also infra notes 86-98 and accompanying text for
further explanation and discussion of the coercive nature of two tier bids.
Defensive Tactics Not Requiring Shareholder Vote
(1) Golden Parachutes:
This term refers to employment agreements with high-level corporate officers which guar-
antee large lump-sum payments, continued employment, or generous severance packages in
the event of a change in control. Schreiber v. Burlington Northern, Inc., 472 U.S. 1, 3 n.2
(1985). Golden parachutes act as a defensive tactic because a bidder may think twice before
pursuing a target which forces it to retain current management employees or pay substantial
amounts of money to get rid of them. In Minstar Acquiring Corp. v. AMF Inc., a federal
district court in New York found that severance benefits triggered only by changes in control
"raise a strong inference that [the target's] board acted only to entrench itself." 621 F. Supp.
1252, 1261 (S.D.N.Y. 1985). But see S. LORNE, supra note 38, at § 4.05[l][e] (aggregate size of




This term refers to a company's repurchase of its shares from a hostile bidder at a price
significantly in excess of the current market price. Responsibilities of Corporate Officers &
Directors Under Federal Securities Laws, supra note 10, at 72. Greenmail acts as a defense
measure because the threat of an unwanted bidder is eliminated by the payoff. See generally
Note, Greenmail: Targeted Stock Repurchases and the Management Entrenchment Hypothesis,
98 HARV. L. REv. 1045 (1985).
(3) Poison Pill:
This defense measure deters bidders by making the cost of a takeover prohibitively expen-
sive. Responsibilities of Corporate Officers & Directors Under Federal Securities Laws, supra
note 10, at 72. Under a poison-pill plan, a special class of stock is issued upon some triggering
event, such as the acquisition of a stated percentage of the company's stock. Dynamics Corp.
of Am. v. CTS Corp., 794 F.2d 250, 254 (7th Cir. 1986), rev'd on other grounds, 481 U.S. 69
(1987). These newly issued shares are available to existing shareholders at a bargain price. Id.
at 254-55. Such share issuances reduce the target's desirability by decreasing the bidder's per-
centage ownership upon triggering of the poison pill provisions. Because the bidder's owner-
ship percentage is reduced, the bidder must purchase more shares in order to attain control.
Id. at 255. In CTS, the Seventh Circuit noted that the validity of poison-pill plans depends on
whether stockholder wealth is maximized. Id. at 256.
(4) Use of a White Knight:
A "white knight" is a "friendly" bidder which acquires control of the target company in
order to prevent a hostile bidder from taking control. Responsibilities of Corporate Officers &
Directors Under Federal Securities Laws, supra note 10, at 73. Even though a change in con-
trol occurs, a white knight is considered "friendly" because the white knight often will agree to
retain current management and current operating policies. See, e.g., West Point-Pepperell,
Inc. v. J.P. Stevens & Co., 542 A.2d 770, 779 (Del. Ch. 1988) (white knight offer greatly
preferred because white knight "had indicated it wanted the current management to stay on").
(5) Sale of Crown Jewels:
This term refers to the corporation's "most prized asset" which, when sold, has the dual
effect of reducing the target's attractiveness and giving the corporation cash to defend against a
pending takeover. Responsibilities of Corporate Officers & Directors Under Federal Securities
Laws, supra note 10, at 72.
(6) Lock-ups:
A "lock-up" refers to an agreement giving a "friendly" bidder an advantage over all
others. Id. For a thorough discussion of lock-up arrangements, see A. FLEISCHER, supra, at
388.88-.111 (1987). See also infra notes 174-89 and accompanying text for a discussion of
Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1986). In Revlon, the
court enjoined a lock-up arrangement because it discriminated against a competing bidder
offering greater consideration to Revlon shareholders. Id. at 184-85.
(7) Management Leveraged Buyout (LBO) and Sales of Shares to an Employee Stock Owner-
ship Plan (ESOP):
If enacted in good faith, management can effectively retain control by purchasing com-
pany shares either directly or indirectly. In these cases, however, courts scrutinize manage-
ment's motivations more closely. For example, in Edelman v. Fruehauf Corp., a management
plan to directly purchase company shares in an LBO transaction was struck down because
company directors favored management and failed to act in good faith. 798 F.2d 882, 885 (6th
Cir. 1986).
Similarly, the Delaware Chancery court struck down the defensive use of an ESOP find-
ing a breach of directors' duty of loyalty where the "effect of the [defensive measure] ...
cannot be justified as reasonable." A.C. Acquisitions Corp. v. Anderson, Clayton & Co., 519
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attempts. 7 However, such decisions are subject to additional safeguards
designed to guard against potential conflicts of interest.78
Directors of a corporation have an obligation to protect the corpora-
tion and its shareholders from harm.79 Some legal scholars argue that
directors should be given broad discretion to defend against takeovers
because all takeovers are harmful.8 0 Other legal scholars argue that di-
rectors faced with an unwanted takeover proposal should be passive be-
cause takeovers serve as an important check on management efficiency."
The Supreme Court, 2 Congress,83 and the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC)84 all recognize that, in reality, some takeovers are
harmful, while others are useful. Ideally, the business judgment rule
A.2d 103, 114 (Del. Ch. 1986) (emphasis in original). But see Polaroid Corp. v. Disney, 862
F.2d 987, 1000 (3rd Cir. 1988) (upholding defensive use of ESOP, finding that "[t]he mere
presence of a conflict of interest does not, of course, prove that management's hostile reaction
to a tender offer is not in the best interest of shareholders").
(8) Creation of an Antitrust Problem:
Once a bidder is known, an antitrust problem can be created by the target's acquisition of
a business that competes in the same industry as the bidder. A. FLEISCHER, supra, at 111-13.
The purpose of a defensive acquisition such as this is to either delay an acquisition pending
determination of compliance with federal antitrust statutes, or to preclude the acquisition alto-
gether. Id.
77. Pogostin v. Rice, 480 A.2d 619, 627 (Del. 1984).
78. See generally Note, Outside Directors and the Modified Business Judgment Rule in
Hostile Takeovers: A New Test for Director Liability, 62 S. CAL. L. REV. 645 (1989). See also
infra notes 116-89 and accompanying text for a discussion of additional requirements neces-
sary for business judgment rule protection of takeover prevention decisions.
79. Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 954 (Del. 1985) ("[T]he board's
power to act derives from its fundamental duty and obligation to protect the corporate enter-
prise, which includes stockholders, from harm. .. ").
80. See, eg., Trevor, Hostile Takeovers: Wrong on the Facts and Wrong on the Law, CON-
TROLLERS Q., Fall 1989, at 2. Trevor, a partner in the international law firm, Jones, Day,
Reavis & Pogue, proposes an abolition of all tender offers. Id. at 6.
81. Easterbrook & Fischel, The Proper Role of Target Management in Responding to a
Tender Offer, 94 HARV. L. REv. 1161, 1169 (1981).
82. See CTS, 481 U.S. at 92 n.13 (1987) ("No one doubts that some successful tender
offers will provide more effective management .... "); Piper v. Chris-Craft, 430 U.S. 1, 34
(1977) (recognizing the "plight of takeover bidders faced with 'unfair tactics by entrenched
management' ").
83. See H.R. REP. No. 1711, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 2, reprinted in 1968 U.S. CODE, CONG.
& ADMIN. NEWS 2811, 2813 ("[T]akeover bids... serve a useful purpose in providing a check
on entrenched but inefficient management."). See also infra notes 526-33 and accompanying
text for a discussion of the legislative history and purpose of the Williams' Act, 15 U.S.C.
§§ 78m(d)-(e), 78n(d)-(f) (1988).
84. Concept Release on Takeovers and Contests for Corporate Control: Advance Notice
of Possible Commission Actions, Exchange Act Release No. 23,486, [1985-1986 Transfer
Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCL) 1 84,018, at 88,204 (July 31, 1986) ("Tender offers can
benefit shareholders by offering them an opportunity to sell their shares at a premium and by
guarding against management entrenchment.").
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should only protect directors' decisions to defend against harmful
takeovers.
A proposed takeover may be harmful if it is either procedurally co-
ercive or substantively unfair.85 This section analyzes what procedural
and substantive aspects of takeovers may be undesirable.
1. Procedural coercion
Procedural coercion typically results from two-tier front-loaded
bids.86 In a two-tier front-loaded tender offer, the bidder offers to pay a
significant cash premium to a majority of, but not all, target shareholders
in order to gain control.87 The remaining "back-end" shareholders are
then bought out with a lower valued, and usually lower grade, securities
"package" or with "junk bonds." 8 The difference between the price or
quality of consideration offered in the "front end" compared with the
"back end" may coerce target shareholders.8 9 Shareholders may be "co-
erced because they must act independently to assess whether the tender
offer will be successful."9 Shareholders thinking the bidder will be suc-
85. City Capital Assocs. Ltd. Partnership v. Interco Inc., 551 A.2d 787, 797 (Del. Ch.),
appeal dismissed, 556 A.2d 1070 (Del. 1988). The Delaware Supreme Court has recently re-
fused to limit threats directors are empowered to defend against to just procedural and sub-
stantive threats. Paramount Communications, Inc. v. Time Inc., No. 284, 1989, slip op. at 34-
35 (Del. Feb. 26, 1990). The court noted "that directors may consider, when evaluating the
threat posed by a takeover bid, the 'inadequacy of the price offered, nature and timing of the
offer, questions of illegality, the impact on contingencies other than shareholders, the risk of
nonconsummation and the quality of securities being offered in the exchange.'" Id. at 35-36
(quotation omitted). See infra notes 382-417 and accompanying text for a discussion of the
Time court's analysis.
86. City Capital, 551 A.2d at 797.
87. Two-Tier Tender Offer Pricing and Non-Tender Offer Purchase Programs-Advance
Notice of Possible Commission Action, Exchange Act Release No. 21,079, [1984 Transfer
Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 83,637, at 86,915 n.1 (June 21, 1984).
88. Id. See also Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 956 (Del. 1985) (two-
tier bid planned to "squeeze out of the [minority] shareholders in the 'back-end' merger [with]
'junk bonds' worth far less than [their face value]" found coercive). Junk bonds are high-yield
securities which are considered higher risk than investment-grade debt. Buffett, Dingman,
Gray & Lowenstein, Hostile Takeovers and Junk Bond Financing: A Panel Discussion, in
KNIGHTS, RAIDERS, AND TARGETS 11, 11 (1988). See also infra note 102 for a general discus-
sion of junk bonds.
89. Lipton, Corporate Governance in the Age of Finance Corporatism, 136 U. PA. L. REV.
1, 19 (1987) [hereinafter Lipton 1].
90. Herzel, Schmidt & Davis, Why Corporate Directors Have a Right to Resist Tender Of-
fers, 3 CORP. L. REV. 107, 111 (1980). This situation is sometimes called the "prisoner's di-
lemma" because like a prisoner, a shareholder can optimize his or her strategy only if he or she
knows and can control what the other shareholders will do. Id. See also Minstar, 621 F. Supp.
at 1255 ("Under the 'prisoner's dilemma,' individual dispersed shareholders are forced to
tender their shares into a partial offer regardless of whether they think the offer being proposed
gives them full and fair value. They act out of fear .... ").
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cessful will tender their shares at the front end. 91 By tendering immedi-
ately, shareholders eliminate the risk of losing their chance to obtain the
premium offered, but those shareholders also sacrifice the possibility of
receiving a higher premium from a subsequent bidder.92 Shareholders
anticipating that the tender offeror will not be successful will not tender
their shares. Those shareholders will hold out hoping for a subsequent
higher offer.93
One court observed that two-tier bids are "classic coercive mea-
sure[s] designed to stampede shareholders into tendering at the first tier,
even if the price is inadequate, out of fear of what they will [or will not]
receive at the back end of the transaction."94 By contrast, the "all-cash,
all-shares" offer is not procedurally coercive. 95 As the descriptive title
indicates, "all-cash, all-shares" bids do not offer shareholders low grade
debt or equity securities.96 In addition, because the same cash considera-
tion is offered for all shares, this type of offer does not coerce uninformed
shareholders into tendering for fear of "losing out" on the premium of-
fered.97 A shareholder can decide individually whether to tender, and
that decision is not dependent on the decisions of all other
shareholders.98
91. Jarrell, The Wealth Effects of Litigation by Targets: Do Interests Diverge in a Merge?,
28 J.L. & ECON. 151, 156 (1985).
92. Id. An individual shareholder is assured some tender premium, which otherwise may
be sacrificed if other shareholders tender their shares first. Id.
93. Id.
94. Unocal, 493 A.2d at 956.
95. See, e.g., Robert M. Bass Group, Inc. v. Evans, 552 A.2d 1227, 1240 (Del. Ch. 1988)
(unsolicited "offers proposed the same price to all stockholders, were not 'front-end loaded,'
and their financing did not depend upon a 'break-up' of the [c]ompany"). See also cases cited
infra note 97.
96. "Equity securities generally create or contemplate a shareholder (or stockholder) rela-
tionship, with the shareholders being, in a broad sense, 'insiders' who 'own' the corporation (as
compared to the holders of debt securities who are 'outsiders' 'owned' by the corporation)."
H. HENN & J. ALEXANDER, supra note 7, at 383.
97. Some courts have found that an all-cash, all-share offer does not pose a threat great
enough to justify business judgment rule protection of a board decision to defend against it.
See, eg., Robert M. Bass Group, 552 A.2d at 1240 (No "selling or nonselling shareholder was
coerced [by all shares cash offer] or otherwise harmed in the process."); AC Acquisitions Corp.
v. Anderson, Clayton & Co., 519 A.2d 103, 112 (Del. Ch. 1986) (all shares cash offer not
unfair). But see Amanda Acquisition Corp. v. Universal Foods Corp., 708 F. Supp. 984, 1013
(E.D. Wis.) (court upheld management's defense against proposed all-cash, all-shares tender
offer, noting "[t]here is an element of coercion or risk even in an all cash, all shares offer"),
aff'd, 877 F.2d 496 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 367 (1989); Paramount Communica-
tions, Inc. v. Time Inc., No. 284, 1989, slip op. at 34-35 (Del. Feb. 26, 1990) (rejecting plain-
tiffs' argument that all-cash, all-shares offer cannot be procedurally coercive).
98. Robert M. Bass Group, 552 A.2d at 1243 (shareholders able to make own choice and,
therefore, directors "not free to 'cram down' [economically inferior] transaction").
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2. Substantive unfairness
Substantive unfairness to shareholders can result from inadequate
bids, which are not procedurally coercive.99 Bids may be inadequate
either because the price itself is too low"°° or because the quality of the
consideration offered is inadequate.' A low quality bid may, for exam-
ple, consist of equity securities or junk bonds. 102 Such bids are arguably
less valuable to tendering shareholders than all-cash offers.1 3 Moreover,
shareholders who tender in a non-cash tender offer do not receive imme-
diate value for their shares as do shareholders who tender in a cash bid.
The value of the debt or equity consideration accepted in response to a
non-cash offer is dependent on the future operation of the now highly
leveraged company, managed by the successful bidder.1°
Unsolicited offers consisting of either low price or poor quality can
justify defensive action by corporate directors.105 Directors' affirmative
duty to protect shareholders from harm includes the potential harm aris-
ing from a substantively unfair bid. 0 6 Additionally, some commentators
argue that even all-cash tender offers can be substantively unfair when
99. City Capital, 551 A.2d at 797.
100. Id. (threat might be posed if price inadequate).
101. See, e.g., Unocal, 493 A.2d at 956 ("junk bonds" worth far less than face value of $54
consideration offered); West Point-Pepperell, 542 A.2d at 781 n.6 (directors may consider
"form of consideration, timing of the transaction [and] risk of non-consummation," as well as
price).
102. The term "junk bonds" refers to high-yield debt which typically pays interest at three
to four percentage points more than investment-grade debt. Buffett, Dingman, Gray & Low-
enstein, supra note 88, at 11. The higher interest rate compensates for the increased risk of
default borne by junk-bond holders. Id. Junk-bond financing of takeovers might involve abuse
if it puts the target company in a "precarious financial position." Id. But see Noninvestment
Grade Debt as a Source of Tender Offer Financing, Securities and Exchange Commission,
Office of the Chief Economist, Study in Full Text, [1985-1986 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L.
Rep. (CCH) % 84,011, at 88,170 (June 20, 1986) ("[Junk bond financing should be regarded as
an innovative reaction by financial markets to specialized financing needs.").
103. Cf. Unocal, 493 A.2d at 956 (allowing directors to consider type of consideration of-
fered in deciding whether to accept or reject bid).
104. Many commentators have argued that junk bonds are less risky than the media has
portrayed. See, e.g., M. Jensen, The Takeover Controversy: Analysis and Evidence in
KNIGHTS, TARGETS, AND RAIDERS 314, 339 (1988). One author notes that the degree of risk
of particular junk bonds is difficult to predict because the widespread use of junk bonds is a
relatively recent phenomenon. Id. But see Smith & Sesit, UAL Clouds Banks' Bigger Buy-Out
Role, Wall St. J., Oct. 20, 1989, at Cl, col. 3 ("In the wake of Campeau's problems, prices of
junk bonds tumbled, throwing into doubt the ability of corporate acquirors to finance large
takeovers with the help of junk bond sales.").
105. See, eg., Unocal, 493 A.2d at 956 (quality inadequate); Paramount Communications,
Inc. v. Time Inc., [1989 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 94,514, at 93,272 (Del.
Ch. July 14, 1989) (price inadequate), aff'd, No. 284, 1989 (Del. 'Feb. 26, 1990).
106. Unocal, 493 A.2d at 954.
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financed with high-yield debt."°7 In this scenerio, the unfairness is not to
the shareholders, who receive their cash premium and are no longer con-
cerned with the company operations."' 8 Rather, the risk that the high-
yield debt will eventually require a "bust up" of company operations is
passed on to the corporation itself,'0 9 harming other groups who con-
tinue their relationship with the company, such as employees, creditors
and consumers. 1 o
Typically in a junk bond-financed "bust up" takeover, the successful
bidder will replace management, sell assets, lay off employees and reduce
research and development projects in order to maximize the company's
short-term liquidity necessary to finance debt costs."' In some states,
local legislators, fearful of plant closures and worker layoffs resulting
from junk bond-financed takeovers, have codified directors' right to con-
sider non-shareholder effects of takeovers." 2 Legal scholars widely de-
bate whether potential effects on non-shareholders arising from bids
which do not threaten shareholders can ever justify defensive action.' '
On the one hand, directors may have a social responsibility to their local
107. See, eg., Lipton I, supra note 89, at 11. "High-yield debt" is used synonymously with
"junk bonds" in this Comment. See supra note 102 for a general discussion of junk bonds.
108. See TW Servs., Inc. v. SWT Acquisition Corp., [1988-1989 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec.
L. Rep. (CCH) 1 94,334, at 92,179 (Del. Ch. Mar. 2, 1989) (When sale of company for cash is
imminent, no "long run" shareholder interest exists because "shareholders will be removed
from the field by the contemplated transaction.").
109. Lipton I, supra note 89, at 11.
110. See Unocal, 493 A.2d at 955 (directors may consider effects of proposed takeover on
non-shareholder constituencies); Lipton, Takeover Bids in the Target's Boardroom, 35 Bus.
LAW. 101, 115 (1979) (hereinafter Lipton II) ("[N]ational policy requires that directors also
consider the long-term interests of the shareholders and the company as a business enterprise
with all of its constituencies .... ").
111. Lipton I, supra note 89, at 11, 23 & n. 103. "Bust up" takeovers also potentially harm
target company's pre-existing creditors because outstanding debt becomes riskier and conse-
quently less valuable. Id. at 27.
112. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. § 302A.251(5) (West Supp. 1990) ("[A] director may, in
considering the best interests of the corporation, consider the interests of the corporation's
employees, customers, suppliers, and creditors, the economy of the state and nation, commu-
nity and societal considerations .... ); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 351.347(4) (Vernon Supp. 1990)
("In exercising its business judgment concerning any acquisition proposal ... the board of
directors ... may consider the.., social, legal and economic effects on employees, suppliers,
customers, and others . . . ."); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 8363(b) (Purdon Supp. 1989)
("directors may ... consider the effects of any action upon employees, upon suppliers and
customers of the corporation and upon communities in which offices or other establishments of
the corporation are located .... ").
113. Compare Easterbrook & Fisehel, supra note 81, at 1164 (directors should consider
shareholders only) with Lipton I, supra note 89, at 37-41 (non-shareholder considerations ap-
propriate). See also infra notes 463-500 and accompanying text for further discussion of non-
shareholder considerations.
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communities;1 1 4 but on the other hand, in a takeover situation, directors
owe their primary fiduciary duties to the company's shareholders.115 In
general, the priority of directors' duties when faced with a potentially
coercive offer is to consider the shareholders first, the company second,
and if state statutes expressly permit, non-shareholder constituencies last.
D. The Business Judgment Rule Applied to
Contests for Corporate Control
Directors possess the power and discretion to hinder or effectively
preclude an attempted takeover. 16 Additionally, directors have an af-
firmative duty to defend against genuine threats to the company and its
shareholders. 7 However, directors who act to entrench themselves or
current management may be subject to personal liability, and the deci-
sion they authorized may be enjoined.' 8 The difficulty in determining
when a genuine threat to the company or its shareholders exists, and in
assessing the purity of directors' motivations, creates a unique and con-
troversial setting in which to apply the business judgment rule. 19
Although courts are aware that a takeover bid may threaten shareholders
or the corporation itself, courts are also concerned with the potential for
directors to abuse their power or discretion.'20 Therefore, courts have
114. Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624, 646 n.* (Powell, J., concurring in part).
115. Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 872 (Del. 1985).
116. See, eg., Paramount Communications, Inc. v. Time Inc., [1989 Transfer Binder] Fed.
Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 94,514, at 93,284 (Del. Ch. July 14, 1989), aff'd, No. 284, 1989 (Del.
Feb. 26, 1990). See supra note 76 for a discussion of common defensive measures target com-
panies implement to defend against unwanted takeovers.
117. Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 954 (Del. 1985). See supra notes
75-115 and accompanying text for a discussion of how takeover threats may harm a corpora-
tion and its shareholders. However, all challenges to corporate control do not harm corpora-
tions or their shareholders, and in fact, control challenges may be a useful check on inefficient
management. See supra notes 81-84 and accompanying text.
118. See Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, 506 A.2d 173, 184 (Del. 1986)
(directors' decision enjoined because its "principal benefit went to directors").
119. See H.R. REP. No. 1028, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 1, 15.
The business judgment rule has a long history and for decades has served a legitimate
purpose in shielding directors from liability for their conduct in running the day-to-
day business of a corporation for the benefit of its shareholders. However, the appli-
cation of the rule may be inappropriate in the context of contested takeover attempts
or other situations involving a threatened change in control of a corporation. In such
situations, corporate managers often have a clear interest in maintaining their jobs,
and this interest may conflict with both the long-term interests of the company and
the interests of shareholders in selling their shares to the highest bidder or in gaining
new management for the corporation.
Id.
120. See, e.g., Unocal, 493 A.2d at 954 (in contests for corporate control, "omnipresent
specter" of directorial self-interest exists). See infra notes 418-40 and accompanying text for
an analysis of directors' motivations and potential abuse of power.
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struggled in analyzing the validity of defensive actions 12' authorized by
directors opposed to an attempted takeover, and in deciding whether the
business judgment rule should apply.122
In order to determine whether directors have acted in response to a
genuine threat to the corporation or its shareholders, courts first conduct
a threshold inquiry into the financial independence of the target's
board. 123 If the board's independence is confirmed, courts then require
satisfaction of the board's fiduciary obligations of good faith and due
care.124 Once these threshold requirements are met, the burden of proof
shifts to the party challenging the board action.125 The business judg-
ment rule will protect directors and their decisions as long as the board
reasonably perceived a threat to the corporation or its shareholders and
the response taken was reasonable in relation to that threat.
126
Courts allow the business judgment rule to protect board decisions
to defend against both immediately threatened takeovers 127 and potential
future takeovers.12 8 In either instance, the test for determining whether a
challenged defense is valid turns on whether the board's action was rea-
sonably related to a viable threat. 129
A different analysis, however, applies when a change in control is
inevitable. 1 0 Under these circumstances, directors are no longer permit-
ted to defend against unwanted suitors. 3 ' Instead, directors are obli-
gated to conduct an "auction" and to maximize current value for
121. See supra note 76 for a discussion of common defensive measures.
122. Compare Minstar Acquiring Corp. v. AMF Inc., 621 F. Supp. 1252, 1259 (S.D.N.Y.
1985) (defensive tactics different from other decisions afforded protection of business judgment
rule) with Pogostin v. Rice, 480 A.2d 619, 627 (Del. 1984) (business judgment rule equally
applicable in defensive contexts).
123. In re RJR Nabisco, Inc. Shareholders Litig., [1988-1989 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L.
Rep. (CCH) % 94,194, at 91,709 (Del. Ch. Jan. 31), appeal denied mem., 556 A.2d 1070 (Del.
1989). See also infra notes 418-40 and accompanying text for a discussion of whether a board
can ever be truly independent.
124. RJR Nabisco, [1988-1989 Transfer Binder] Fed. See. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 94,194, at
91,709.
125. Norlin Corp. v. Rooney, Pace Inc., 744 F.2d 255, 264 (2d Cir. 1984).
126. Unocal, 493 A.2d at 955.
127. Id.
128. See Moran v. Household Int'l, Inc., 500 A.2d 1346, 1350 (Del. 1985) ("[T]he distin-
guishing factor [of a general future threat, as opposed to a specific and immediate threat] does
not result in the [d]irectors losing the protection of the business judgment rule.").
129. Id. at 1350 (Unocal applies despite distinguishing factor of future, as opposed to imme-
diate, threat).
130. Revlon, 506 A.2d at 182. See infra notes 309-81 and accompanying text for a discus-
sion of limitations of Revlon's "change in control" triggering point, as enunciated by the Dela-
ware Supreme Court in Time.
131. Revlon, 506 A.2d at 182 ("the object no longer is to protect or maintain the corporate
enterprise but to sell it to the highest bidder").
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shareholders.132 The following cases establish the framework for apply-
ing the business judgment rule to decisions involving corporate control
defensive measures.
1. Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co.
In Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co.,33 Mesa Petroleum, an en-
tity controlled by T. Boone Pickens,134 owned thirteen percent of Unocal
stock. 35  Mesa made a hostile tender offer 136 for sixty-four million
shares, or approximately thirty-seven percent of Unocal's outstanding
shares at a cash price of $54 per share. 137 Mesa planned to complete its
two-tier "front-loaded" cash offer 138 with "junk bonds" purportedly
worth $54 per share.
139
Unocal's thirteen board members, including eight outside direc-
tors, 14° consulted with two reputable investment bankers regarding the
merits of Mesa's offer.14 1 Based on these consultations, Unocal's board
132. Id.
133. 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985).
134. T. Boone Pickens is a well-known corporate raider who is also chairman of United
Shareholders Association, a shareholder advocacy group. See Saiwen, Ruling by SEC May
Threaten Parachute Plans, Wall St. J., Jan. 18, 1990, at A3, col. 4.
135. Unocal, 493 A.2d at 949.
136. Id. In a tender offer, the bidder typically offers shareholders of a target company a
significant premium over the existing market price for a majority or all of the target's outstand-
ing shares. Tender Offer Update: 1989, MERGERS & AcQuISITIONS, May-June 1989, at 27.
In 1988, 61% of tender offer premiums exceeded 50% of the stock market prices one month
prior to the announcement of the initial bid. Id. Although not specifically defined, a tender
offer generally requires: (1) an active solicitation; (2) of shareholders; (3) of a substantial per-
centage of outstanding shares; (4) at a premium; (5) under fixed terms; (6) for a limited period
of time; (7) with pressure placed on offerees. H. HENN & J. ALEXANDER, supra note 7, at 821
n.39 (citing Wellman v. Dickenson, 475 F. Supp. 783 (S.D.N.Y. 1979)).
Shareholders of target companies have three options when faced with a tender proposal:
retain their shares, tender shares if the offer becomes effective, or dispose of shares in the open
market, which usually rises on the tender announcement. Responsibilities of Corporate Officers
& Directors Under Federal Securities Laws, supra note 10, at 75. If management of the target
company believes the proposed tender offer is not in the best interests of the corporation and
its shareholders, it may implement "defensive" measures to eliminate or impede the takeover
threat. See supra note 76 for a discussion of common defensive measures.
137. Unocal, 493 A.2d at 949.
138. See supra notes 86-98 and accompanying text for a discussion of the potentially coer-
cive nature of two-tier bids.
139. Unocal, 493 A.2d at 949.
140. An outside director is one who is not also employed within the corporation as are, for
example, the chief financial officer or chief executive officer. See generally Simpson, The
Emerging Role of the Special Committee-Ensuring Business Judgment Rule Protection in the
Context of Management Leveraged Buyouts and Other Corporate Transactions Involving Con-
flicts of Interest, 43 Bus. LAW. 665 (1988) for a discussion of how outside directors enhance
the procedural integrity of the corporate decision-making process.
141. Unocal, 493 A.2d at 950.
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unanimously adopted a resolution to reject Mesa's "grossly inadequate"
offer.142 To defend against Mesa's takeover threat, Unocal made a com-
peting discriminatory self-tender offer which consisted of debt securities
valued at $72 per share. 143 This offer was open to all Unocal sharehold-
ers, except Mesa. 44
Mesa filed suit to enjoin its exclusion from Unocal's self-tender of-
fer. 145 Unocal's directors argued that their decision was justified and re-
sulted from their reasonable belief that the self-tender served a valid
corporate purpose.146 In upholding Unocal's action, the Supreme Court
of Delaware accepted the board's conclusion that Mesa's bid was inade-
quate.1 47 The court was concerned, however, with an "omnipresent
specter" of director self-interest in takeover contests, 148 and cautioned
that directors did "not have unbridled discretion to defeat any perceived
threat by any Draconian means available."'
149
The Unocal court fashioned a two-part "proportionality" test to
govern whether the business judgment rule protects takeover defense de-
cisions. 150 First, directors must show that they "reasonably" believed
that a danger to corporate policy and effectiveness existed.' 5 ' To satisfy
this burden, directors must show that they exercised good faith and per-
formed a reasonable investigation.' 52 This showing, the court stated,
would be "materially enhanced" when outside directors support board
decisions. 53 Presumably, decisions approved by outside directors would
142. Id.
143. Id. at 951.
144. Id. Subsequent to this case, the SEC enacted the "all-holders rule" which proscribes
exclusionary offers. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-10(a)(1) (1987). The all-holders rule provides that a
bidder's tender offer must be open to "all security holders of the class of securities subject to
the tender offer." Id. See also Polaroid Corp. v. Disney, 862 F.2d 987, 991-95 (3rd Cir. 1988)
for a discussion of the purpose of the all-holders rule and the SEC's enactment authority. See
Amendments to Tender Offer Rules-All-Holders and Best-Price, Securities Act Release No.
6653 [1985-1986 Transfer Binder] Fed. See. L. Rep. (CCH) 84,016 (Sept. 4, 1986) for a
general discussion of the legislative history and congressional intent of the all-holders rule.
145. Unocal, 493 A.2d at 951.
146. Id. at 953. Unocal argued that its directors acted properly to protect the company and
its shareholders from harm. Id.
147. Id. at 956 (acknowledging coercive effect of offer by nationally known greenmailer).
148. Id. at 954.
149. Id. at 955.
150. Id.
151. Id. (citing Cheff v. Mathes, 199 A.2d 548, 554-55 (Del. 1964)).
152. Id. A reasonable investigation assumes that it commences on a timely basis. See
Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 872 (Del. 1985) ("determination of whether a business
judgment is an informed one turns on whether the directors have informed themselves 'prior to
making a business decision' .... ") (emphasis added) (quoting Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d
805, 812 (Del. 1984)).
153. Unocal, 493 A.2d at 955. Courts upholding defensive measures are increasingly focus-
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not be tainted with the same conflict of interest facing inside directors.
Unocal's second prong requires that any defensive measure implemented
"be reasonable in relation to the threat posed." '54 Under this prong, di-
rectors may consider the nature and timing of the takeover offer, the
quality of the securities offered and the predicted effect of a change of
control on the corporate enterprise.15 Directors may also consider the
predicted effect of a takeover on non-shareholder constituencies includ-
ing employees, creditors, customers "and perhaps even the community
generally."
' 156
In applying this test, the Unocal court concluded that T. Boone
Pickens, a nationally known "greenmailer,"'' 1 7 reasonably posed a threat
to company policy."5 8 The court also concluded that Unocal's discrimi-
natory self-tender offer was commensurate with the threat posed by
Pickens.1
59
The court in Unocal also recognized that due to the potential con-
flict of interest which may influence a board decision to defend against an
immediately threatened takeover, traditional business judgment rule pro-
tection may be inappropriate. 160 Unocal's two-pronged test was designed
to provide a safeguard against abuses potentially arising from this con-
flict. 16' After Unocal, courts were left to decide whether Unocal or some
other standard of review should apply under different factual situations
involving corporate control contests.
ing on whether the outside directors of the target company supported the board decision. See,
e.g., Grobow v. Perot, 539 A.2d 180, 190 (Del. 1988); West Point-Pepperell, Inc. v. J.P. Ste-
vens & Co., 542 A.2d 770, 782 (Del. Ch. 1988). See also infra notes 429-30 and accompanying
text for a discussion of the role of outside directors and special committees.
154. Unocal, 493 A.2d at 955.
155. Id. The Delaware Supreme Court later clarified these considerations, noting that "[a]
board may have regard for various [non-shareholder] constituencies in discharging its respon-
sibilities, provided there are rationally related benefits accruing to the stockholders." Revlon,
Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, 506 A.2d 173, 182 (Del. 1986).
156. Unocal, 493 A.2d at 955. Cases subsequent to Unocal have expanded the scope of non-
shareholder considerations. See, e.g., Paramount Communications, Inc. v. Time Inc., [1989
Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 94,514, at 93,283 (Del. Ch. July 14, 1989), aff'd,
No. 284, 1989 (Del. Feb. 26, 1990) (considering target company's long-term strategic plan).
See also infra notes 382-417 and accompanying text.
157. Unocal, 493 A.2d at 956. See supra note 76 for a discussion of greenmail payments
and other mechanisms directors utilize to defend against hostile bidders.
158. Unocal, 493 A.2d at 956.
159. Id.
160. Id. at 954.
161. Id. at 954-55.
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2. Moran v. Household International, Inc.
In Moran v. Household International, Inc.,' 62 decided shortly after
Unocal, the Delaware Supreme Court was faced with a different factual
scenario and concluded that Unocal's proportionality analysis again was
appropriate. 163 The defensive plan upheld in Moran involved a poison
pill, a popular defensive strategy.'64 Household, the target company, did
not adopt this defensive measure in reaction to a specific and immediate
threat, as did the target company in Unocal, but rather "as a preventative
mechanism to ward off [possible]future advances."'
' 61
Financial studies showed Household's common shares to be signifi-
cantly undervalued, 166 and therefore an unwanted takeover was a legiti-
mate threat. Because of this potential threat, Household adopted a plan
which provided for the issuance of stock rights1 67 upon certain "trigger-
ing" conditions.168 The plan provided that should a majority of House-
hold's shares be acquired, any unexercised rights entitled rightholders to
purchase $200 of Household's common stock for $100.169 Allowing
Household shareholders to purchase shares at a bargain price would in-
crease the number of shares outstanding, and accordingly, increase the
cost and reduce the likelihood of a takeover.
The court applied the same analysis as in Unocal to determine the
validity of Household's defensive rights plan.' 70 The court found that
Household's directors reasonably believed that a threat to the corpora-
tion existed and agreed that the board decision to implement the stock-
rights plan was proportional to that threat. 71 In making its ruling, the
162. 500 A.2d 1346 (Del. 1985).
163. Id. at 1356.
164. See supra note 76 for an explanation and discussion of poison pills and other takeover
defenses.
165. Moran, 500 A.2d at 1349 (emphasis added).
166. Id.
167. Stock rights entitle the holder of the right to purchase common or participating pre-
ferred stock at a substantial discount. A. FLEISCHER, supra note 76, at 55. The defensive use
of a stock rights plan, such as a "poison pill," inhibits the substantial accumulation of stock by
an unwanted bidder and strengthens the target's bargaining power by increasing the cost and
uncertainty of a hostile takeover. Id. See also supra note 76 for a discussion of poison pills and
other takeover defenses.
168. Moran, 500 A.2d at 1348. Under the plan, stock rights were to be issued upon: (1)
announcement of a tender offer for 30% of Household's shares; and (2) acquisition of 20% of
Household's shares by any entity or group. Id.
169. Id. at 1349.
170. Id. at 1356. See also supra notes 150-56 and accompanying text for a discussion of
Unocal's proportionality test.
171. Moran, 500 A.2d at 1356-57. The court, however, left open the possibility of further
scrutiny if the poison pill is later activated. Id. at 1357.
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court suggested that more deference to a company's board may be appro-
priate when the board acts while under no immediate threat, as opposed
to when it acts in response to a specific threat. 172 The court reasoned
that when directors have more time to deliberate, their business expertise
is more likely to be utilized.
1 73
3. Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings
Unocal's two-pronged analysis applies whenever directors are acting
to prevent a change in control, whether that action is in response to an
immediate threat or a future threat. 174 When, however, a change in con-
trol becomes inevitable, a different analysis applies. In Revlon, Inc. v.
MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings,1 75 the Delaware court limited the Uno-
cal proportionality test to circumstances where a target company had
undertaken measures to preserve the company's independence and avoid
a change in management control.1 76 The Revlon court announced that a
stricter test would be applied when a change in control became
inevitable. 1
77
In this case, control of Revlon was pursued by two bidders-
MacAndrews & Forbes, an unwanted tender offeror, and Forstmann,
Little, a "white knight." 178 Revlon entered into an agreement with
Forstmann committing itself to: (1) a lock-up option; 179 (2) a no-shop
provision;180 and, (3) a $25 million cancellation fee payable to Forstmann
if another buyer were to purchase more than 19.9% of Revlon stock.''
Besides committing to this agreement, Revlon favored Forstmann by
providing it with confidential financial data unavailable to MacAndrews
172. Id. at 1350.
173. Id. Arguably, just the opposite is true. When directors have more time to deliberate
and plan a defensive strategy, abrogation of shareholders' rights should be less justifiable.
Under these circumstances, directors have time to consider both shareholders' desires and
potential alternatives. Therefore, a higher level of scrutiny seems appropriate.
174. Id.
175. 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1986).
176. Id. at 182.
177. Id. ("[R]ecognition that the company was for sale... significantly altered the board's
responsibilities under the Unocal standards.").
178. Id. .at 184. See also supra note 76 for a discussion of the defensive use of a "white
knight."
179. Revlon, 506 A.2d at 178. The option allowed Forstmann to purchase certain Revlon
subsidiaries at a significant discount from their fair market values in the event that another
bidder purchased 40% of Revlon shares. Id.
180. Id. A no-shop provision precludes the target company from negotiating with any
other suitors. Id. at 184.
181. Id. at 178.
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& Forbes.' 82 Revlon shareholders and MacAndrews & Forbes sought to
enjoin the Revlon-Forstmann agreement and to require "a level playing
field" in which Revlon could not favor one bidder over another.183 Rev-
lon directors asserted that their actions satisfied the Unocal proportional-
ity test and were protected by the business judgment rule. 184
The Revlon court disagreed with Revlon's directors, and rejected the
proposed application of Unocal's proportionality test. 85 The court dis-
tinguished the circumstances of this case from those in Unocal and found
that once a sale of the target company became inevitable, "[t]he direc-
tors' role changed from defenders of the corporate bastion to auction-
eers." '186 The court designed this new "auction" standard to focus
director attention on shareholder wealth maximization 87 and to pre-
clude directors from "playing favorites" when sale of a target company
was inevitable. 88 In Revlon, the target directors clearly favored Forst-
mann at the expense of shareholder wealth maximization; therefore, the
court .denied the directors business judgment rule protection and en-
joined Revlon's anti-takeover measures.1 89
4. Paramount Communications, Inc. v. Time Inc.
In Paramount Communications, Inc. v. Time Inc.,190 the Delaware
Supreme Court faced a new factual scenario to determine whether Uno-
cal, Revlon, or some other analysis applied. In this case, the court was
asked to decide whether a target company must abandon a preexisting
strategic plan and consider the potential shareholder wealth maximiza-
tion of a proposed non-coercive cash tender offer. 19"' In Time, the Dela-
ware court did not create a new standard of judicial review, but it did
significantly restrict the application of Revlon 192 and added a new facet
182. Id. at 184.
183. Id. at 175.
184. Id. at182.
185. Id. ("there are fundamental limitations upon [Unocal's] prerogative" permitting non-
shareholder considerations).
186. Id.
187. Id. The court held that as auctioneers, directors are "charged with getting the best
price for stockholders." Id.
188. Id. at 184. When "dissolution of the company becomes inevitable, the directors cannot
fulfill their enhanced Unocal duties by playing favqrites with the contending factions." Id. See
infra notes 262-381 and accompanying text for a discussion of whether courts may be retreat-
ing from Revlon's level-playing field and shareholder wealth maximization requirements.
189. Revlon, 506 A.2d at 185.
190. No. 284, 1989 (Del. Feb. 26, 1990).
191. Id. at 25.
192. Id. at 27-31. Revlon was not triggered by Time's initial merger agreement with
Warner, despite a 62% dilution in Time shareholders' ownership. Id. at 24. The court limited
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to the Unocal proportionality test.193
The sequence of events giving rise to the Time litigation began in
1983, when the directors of Time Inc. began considering several opportu-
nities to enhance Time's competitive advantage in the entertainment in-
dustry. 194  Time's goal was to become a world-wide media and
entertainment company,1 95 but the company was also concerned with
preserving the "distinctive and important 'Time culture'" and Time's
"journalistic integrity." 196 On March 3, 1989, after months of negotia-
tions, Time and Warner Communications Inc. entered into a merger
agreement. 197 This agreement was unanimously approved by the boards
of both Time and Warner. 198 The merger agreement provided that: (1)
Warner shareholders would own sixty-two percent of previously out-
standing Time common shares;1 99 and (2) management of the combined
company would be shared equally between the previously separate Time
and Warner management teams. 2°° Part of the reason for structuring a
merger, as opposed to another transactional form, was to take advantage
of various tax and accounting benefits.2 °1
application of Revlon to circumstances of an auction sale or an abandonment of a company's
long-term plan and pursuit of a "break up" of the corporate enterprise. Id. at 28. See infra
notes 262-381 and accompanying text for a discussion of cases, including Time, which limit
Revlon's applicability.
193. See infra notes 382-417 and accompanying text for a discussion of how Time altered
Unocal.
194. Time, No. 284, 1989, slip op. at 8.
195. TIME INC. AND WARNER COMMUNICATIONS INC., JOINT PROXY STATEMENT, TIME
INC., PROSPECTUS 33 (May 22, 1980) [hereinafter JOINT PROXY AND PROSPECTUS].
196. Time, No. 284, 1989, slip op. at 8 n.4. The court noted that Time's board "made a
studious effort to refrain from involvement in Time's editorial policy." Id. The independence
of Time's editorial policies and Time's board purportedly enhanced Time's "journalistic integ-
rity" and its culture. Id.
197. Id. at 15. Delaware law required approval of the merger by the boards of directors of
both Time and Warner. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 251(b) (Supp. 1988) ("The board of
directors of each corporation which desires to merge or consolidate shall adopt a resolution
approving an agreement of merger or consolidation.").
198. Time, No. 284, 1989, slip op. at 15 (approval was unanimous, with all but one Time
director in attendence).
199. Id. at 24.
200. Id. at 16. The shared management agreement required that board representation be
evenly divided between Time and Warner's previously separate boards and provided also for
co-chief executive officers. Id. The estimated cost to Time Warner of retaining co-chief execu-
tive officers was approximated at up to $200 million over ten years. Time, [1989 Transfer
Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 94,514, at 93,275.
201. JOINT PROXY AND PROSPECTUS, supra note 195, at 22. For Time and Warner, the
proposed merger would have been a non-taxable transaction. Id. at 46. In addition, the
merged company would have benefitted from application of the "pooling-of-interests" method
of accounting for business combinations. Id.
For certain qualifying equity mergers, pooling-of-interests accounting allows each com-
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Time realized that the planned merger might put Time "in play,"
and accordingly, the directors obtained "confidence letters" from several
banks, which provided that those banks would not finance a tender offer
for Time.202  Time also entered into a "no-shop" agreement with
Warner, which restricted the board's ability to negotiate a takeover of
Time prior to the planned merger with Warner.20 3 Once the terms of the
merger were settled, Time's board scheduled the required shareholder
vote for June 23, 1989 and mailed proxy solicitations recommending the
merger to the Time shareholders.2
On June 7, 1989, with Time's stock trading at $126 per share,2 °5
Paramount Communications, Inc. launched an unsolicited all-cash, all-
shares2 6 tender offer of $175 per share for Time.20 7 As a result, Time's
pany's assets and liabilities to be carried forward at their pre-merger recorded book values.
BUSINESS COMBINATIONS, Accounting Principles Board Opinion No. 16, f 12 (Accounting
Principles Bd. 1970). Alternatively, "purchase accounting," which is used for non-qualifying
mergers, and acquisitions for cash or debt, requires the assets of the acquired company to be
added to the acquiring company's balance sheet at the current fair market values. Id. at 1 11.
In purchase accounting, the excess between the current fair market value of assets and liabili-
ties and the price paid for the acquired company is capitalized as "goodwill" on the consoli-
dated balance sheet. Id. This "goodwill" is then amortized as an expense that reduces net
income. INTANGIBLE ASSETS, Accounting Principles Board Opinion No. 17, % 27 (Account-
ing Principles Bd. 1970). Unlike the proposed merger, the revised Time-Warner transaction
did not qualify for the favorable "pooling" method; therefore, Time will report goodwill ap-
proximating $9 billion. Time, No. 284, 1989, slip op. at 22.
For a general discussion of purchase and pooling accounting, see PRACTICING LAW IN-
STITUTE, FINANCIAL REPORTING FOR BUSINESS COMBINATIONS, ACCOUNTING FOR LAW-
YERS 1989 313-19 (1989); Fiflis, Accounting for Mergers, Acquisitions and Investments, in a
Nutshell: The Interrelationships of and Criteria for, Purchase or Pooling, the Equity Method,
and Parent-Company-Only and Consolidated Statements, 37 Bus. LAW. 89 (1981).
One of the reasons Time and Warner initially agreed to merge was to take advantage of
the anticipated favorable tax and accounting treatment. Time, No. 284, 1989, slip op. at 10.
Although "pooling" accounting treatment was not a condition of merger, prevention of pool-
ing-of-interests accounting was grounds for termination of the merger agreement. JOINT
PROXY AND PROSPECTUS, supra note 195, at 46.
202. Time, 284, 1989, slip op. at 17.
203. Id.
204. Id. at 8. Approval by a majority of Warner shareholders was required by Delaware
stitutory law. Id. at 15-16. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 251(c) (Supp. 1988) (the merger
agreement "shall be submitted to the stockholders of each constituent corporation ... for the
purpose of acting on the agreement."). However, approval by Time shareholders was required
by New York Stock Exchange rules only. Time, No. 284, 1989, slip op. at 15. Delaware law
did not require approval by Time's shareholders because Time's stock would not have been
affected by the merger, and additional shares were not required to be authorized. Time, [1989
Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 94,514, at 93,270.
205. Time, No. 284, 1989, slip op. at 18.
206. See supra notes 95-98 and accompanying text for a discussion of the advantages which
all-cash, all-shares bids offer shareholders.
207. Time, No. 284, 1989, slip op. at 18. Paramount later increased its offer to $200 per
share, and this, too, was rejected as inadequate. Id. at 23.
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stock price jumped to $182 per share.20 Time directors dampened the
market's enthusiasm, announcing that Time was "not for sale."209
Time directors recognized that with Paramount's bid outstanding,
securing shareholder approval to merge with Warner would be "prob-
lematic."2 10 Therefore, they abandoned the merger plan and instead pur-
sued a $14 billion acquisition of Warner.2 11 This revised Warner
transaction, financed with $12 billion in high-yield debt,2 12 was com-
pleted quickly and without a shareholder vote.213 Time's directors were
confident that the $30 billion 1 4 market value of the combined Time-
Warner company would eliminate any reasonable possibility of Para-
mount tendering for Time Warner. 15
Time shareholders and Paramount sought an injunction to stop
Time's acquisition of Warner,21 6 asserting that Time's directors failed to
maximize shareholder wealth as required by Revlon. 17 Under two dif-
ferent theories, the plaintiffs argued that the Delaware court should ap-
ply the Revlon analysis218 and not the more lenient Unocal standard of
review.2 19
First, the plaintiffs argued that the original Time-Warner merger
agreement demonstrated a decision by Time's board to transfer control
to the Warner shareholders. 220 The plaintiffs reasoned that transferring
sixty-two percent of voting ownership and sacrificing fifty percent of
208. Id. at 21.
209. Id. at 22.
210. Id. at 20. The court noted in its opinion that "Paramount's cash premium would be a
tempting prospect to [Time's shareholders]." Id.
211. Hidler & Landro, Paramount Withdraws.its Hostile Offer as Time Begins its Purchase
of Warner, Wall St. J., July 25, 1989, at A3, col. 1. See also Joint Time and Warner Press
Release, Aug. 23, 1989 (describing consideration for Warner acquisition, which consisted of
38% preferred stock convertible into Time common shares).
212. Richter, Time Warner Details Plans to Pay for Takeover, L.A. Times, Aug. 24, 1989,
Part IV, at 1, col. 5.
213. Time, No. 284, 1989, slip op. at 23; Answering Brief of Time Appellees at 25, Para-
mount Communications, Inc. v. Time Inc., [1989 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1
94,514 (Del. Ch. July 26, 1989) (No. 10,866, consolidated 10,670 and 19,835), aff'd, No. 284,
1989 (Del. Feb. 26, 1990). For a general discussion of the differences between tender offer and
merger requirements, including shareholder voting requirements, see S. LORNE, supra note 38,
at §§ 3.11-.12.
214. Time, No. 284, 1989, slip op. at 30.
215. Hidler & Landro, Paramount Withdraws its Hostile Offer as Time Begins its Purchase
of Warner, Wall St. J., July 25, 1989, at A3, col. 1.
216. Time, No. 284, 1989, slip op. at 3.
217. Id. at 4-5.
218. See supra notes 185-88 and accompanying text for a discussion of the Revlon analysis.
219. Time, No. 284, 1989, slip op. at 24. See supra notes 150-56 and accompanying text for
a discussion of the Unocal test.
220. Time, No. 284, 1989, slip op. at 24.
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management control constituted a "change in control" triggering Revlon
duties.22 The Delaware Supreme Court, however, rejected this argu-
ment, noting that Time never intended to be sold.222
Second, the plaintiffs argued that Revlon should apply because the
$30 billion market value of Time Warner prevented shareholders from
ever obtaining a future control premium. 223 The plaintiffs asserted that
directors may not foreclose the possibility of a future takeover, and there-
fore, the Time-Warner merger obligated the directors to maximize the
shareholders' current value.224 The Delaware Supreme Court, and the
chancery court before it, however, were not convinced that the combined
Time-Warner company would "legally preclude or impede a later sale"
and concluded that Revlon did not apply.225
Having rejected application of Revlon, the supreme court considered
plaintiffs' alternative argument under Unocal.226 Plaintiffs alleged that
even if Unocal applied, rather than Revlon, Paramount's "fully-negotia-
ble" and fairly-priced bid did not reasonably pose a threat to Time or its
shareholders.227 Paramount's bid offered cash for all of Time's outstand-
ing shares, and the bid was bank financed.228 The plaintiffs reasoned that
221. Id.
222. Id at 27-28. The court restricted application of Revlon to circumstances in which a
board puts the company on the "auction block" or when the company "abandons its long-term
strategy and seeks an alternative transaction also involving the breakup of the company." Id.
at 28. See infra notes 277-81 and accompanying text for a discussion of the Time court's
restriction of circumstances triggering Revlon. In restricting Revlon, the Delaware Supreme
Court rejected not only the plaintiffs' argument, but also the narrower rationale of the chan-
cery court. The Delaware Chancery Court had concluded that a Revlon "change in control"
did not result because in a stock for stock merger, control remains "in a fluid aggregation of
unaffiliated shareholders representing a voting majority." Time, [1989 Transfer Binder] Fed.
Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 94,514, at 93,279. The chancery court likened the dilution of voting
control suffered by Time shareholders under the proposed merger agreement to the dilution
suffered in any public distribution of new securities. Id. The chancery court distinguished the
circumstances in Time from those in which control changes from private hands to the public
market, noting that in the latter circumstances, Revlon would "plainly apply." Id. at 93,279.
223. Time, No. 284, 1989, slip op. at 24.
224. Id. The Delaware Supreme Court did not conduct a separate inquiry into the plain-
tiffs' two separate Revlon arguments, but relied on the findings of the chancery court. Id. at
29. See Time, [1989 Transfer Binder] Fed. See. L. Rep. (CCH) 94,514, at 93,280 (plaintiffs
argued that Time board "enter[ed] into a number of agreements that were intended to preclude
or impede the emergence of current value maximizing alternatives.").
225. Time, [1989 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) % 94,514, at 93,281 (emphasis
added). See also Time, No. 284, 1989, slip op. at 29-30 (accepting the chancery court's conclu-
sion that the mere size of the combined Time-Warner company is not sufficient to trigger
Revlon).
226. Time, No. 284, 1989, slip op. at 31-41.
227. Id. at 4.
228. Time, [1989 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 94,514, at 93,282-83. The
plaintiffs cited authority for the proposition that when faced with an all-cash, all-shares offer,
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under these circumstances, a board could not justify defensive action that
was totally unrelated to a threat to the corporation or its shareholders.22 9
The Delaware Supreme Court vehemently rejected any "misconcep-
tions" that all-cash, all-shares offers are non-coercive,230 and refused to
limit application of the business judgment rule under Unocal to circum-
stances where an identifiable substantive or procedural threat exists.231
The court praised Unocal as a flexible analytical tool which was "not
intended [to be] an abstract standard [or] a structured and mechanistic
procedure." '232 The court concluded that Time's directors had reason-
ably perceived threats to: (1) Time's strategic plan of global expansion to
be effected through a combination with Warner;233 and (2) "company
policy and effectiveness." '234
The court acknowledged that the Paramount bid might offer a
greater immediate return to Time's shareholders.235 However, the court
reasoned that directors have the duty to manage the company and are,
therefore, "obligated to charter a course for the corporation which is in
[the corporation's] best interests without regard to a fixed investment ho-
the only potential threat was to the price offered shareholders. Id. at 93,283 (citing City Capi-
tal Assocs. v. Interco Inc., 551 A.2d 787, 796 (Del. Ch.), appeal dismissed, 556 A.2d 1070
(Del. 1988)).
229. Time, No. 284, 1989, slip op. at 34. Courts prior to Time had consistently rejected the
"just say no" defense. See, eg., Grand Metro. PLC v. Pillsbury Co., 558 A.2d 1049, 1060
(Del. Ch. 1988) (no business judgment rule protection for implementation of poison pill which
precluded shareholder acceptance of fully financed "all-shares" cash offer); City Capital As-
socs. Ltd. Partnership v. Interco Inc., 551 A.2d 787, 797 (Del. Ch.) (board "is not authorized
to take preclusive action... [which,] as a practical matter, withdraws from the shareholders
the option to choose between the offer and the status quo or some other board sponsored
alternative"), appeal dismissed, 556 A.2d 1070 (Del. 1988). But see Amanda Acquisition Corp.
v. Universal Foods Corp., 877 F.2d 496, 508-09 (7th Cir.) (if tender offer threatens corpora-
tion's long-term plan, managers may "just say no"), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 367 (1989). See
also generally Yablon, Poison Pills and Litigation Uncertainty, 1989 DUKE L.J. 54; Note,
Shareholder Rights Plans: Saying No to Inadequate Tender Offers, 57 FORDHAM L. REv. 803
(1989).
230. Time, No. 284, 1989, slip op. at 34-35.
231. Id. at 34-36. Before Time, courts allowing the business judgment rule to protect board
decisions under Unocal required a reasonably perceived substantive or procedural threat to the
company or its shareholders. See, e.g., City Capital, 551 A.2d at 797.
232. Time, No. 284, 1989, slip op. at 35.
233. Id. at 21. The court acknowledged that Time's "board's prevailing belief was that
Paramount's [initial $175 per share cash] bid presented a threat to Time's control of its own
destiny and retention of the 'Time Culture.'" Id. The court also accepted the board's conclu-
sion that Paramount's increased offer of $200 per share "was still inadequate and that the
Warner transaction offered a greater long-term value for the stockholders ...." Id. at 23.
234. Id. at 37.
235. Id. at 20.
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rizon. ' ' 236 The court stressed that Time's dual goals of global expansion
and preservation of the "Time culture" exemplified such management
planning. 23 7 The court viewed Time's plan to combine with Warner as a
rational means of pursuing these goals.238
The supreme court also recognized as a defensible threat the poten-
tial for shareholder ignorance.23 9 Time directors allegedly were con-
cerned that shareholders would improvidently tender their shares to
Paramount rather than support the Time-Warner merger out of "igno-
rance or a mistaken belief of the strategic benefit which a business combi-
nation with Warner might produce."2'
Recognizing that Time's strategic plan to combine with Warner was
a legally cognizable interest, and that Paramount's bid threatened that
interest, the court held that Time's decision to recast the Time-Warner
agreement was reasonable. 241 The court concluded that the Time direc-
tors had satisfied the requirements of Unocal and that the business judg-
ment rule protected the directors from personal liability and protected
their decision from judicial second-guessing.242 Although the court pur-
236. Id. See also id. at 39 (directors' "fiduciary duty to manage a corporate enterprise
includes the selection of a time frame for achievement of corporate goals").
237. Id. at 8 n.4. The court stated that the Time directors "believed that Time had become
recognized in this country as an institution built upon a foundation of journalistic integrity."
Id. In addition, the court noted that some of Time's "directors feared that a merger with an
entertainment company would divert Time's focus from news journalism and threaten the
Time Culture." Id. Presumably, Time selected Warner as a vehicle to pursue its strategy of
global expansion because Warner would enhance Time's distribution capacities without sacri-
ficing the "Time culture." Id. at 11-12. The initial merger agreement provided that the board
of directors of the combined company would be equally divided between the then-existing
Time and Warner directors. Id. at 16. A separate "editorial committee," with a majority of its
members representing Time was planned to ensure continuance of Time's journalistic integrity
and culture. Id.
238. Id. at 8.
239. Id. at 36-37. The court noted that:
[C]ertain Time directors expressed their concern that their stockholders would not
comprehend the long-term benefits of the Warner merger. Large quantities of Time
shares were held by institutional investors. The board feared that even though there
appeared to be wide support for the Warner transaction, Paramount's cash premium
would be a tempting prospect to these investors.
Id. at 20.
240. Id. at 36. The legitimacy of this concern of Time's directors is highly questionable.
Clearly, informing shareholders of a proposed merger transaction endorsed by the board of
directors is the directors' responsibility. See infra notes 393-417 and accompanying text for a
discussion and criticism of the court's allowing directors to "defend" against threats caused by
their own abdication of duties.
241. Time, No. 284, 1989, slip op. at 38-39.
242. Id. The chancery court had noted in its opinion that "[i]t is not part of the function of
the court to evaluate whether the Time-Warner deal is a good one for Time shareholders or a
poor one." Time, [1989 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ] 94,514, at 93,284. The
chancery court also noted that "the innovative and constructive rule of Unocal must be cau-
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ported to apply the two-pronged test of Unocal,24 3 it focused solely on the
process of the board's decision,244 and failed to consider whether any
reasonably perceived threat to Time or its shareholders was actually
posed. Had the court applied even a minimal level of scrutiny, it would
have realized that the board was "protecting" the shareholders from the
board's abdication of its own duties.245
Without expressly overruling or precisely redefining the require-
ments of Unocal and Revlon, the Time court significantly broadened di-
rector discretion in takeover situations. The extent of this broadened
discretion, however, is unclear. The language of the supreme court's
opinion left open several important questions. For example, can a com-
pany avoid Revlon duties simply by professing a goal to remain in-
dependent? If so, can a company avoid Revlon duties even if that
company plans a fundamental change in the company's capital and its
ownership structure?2 46 Second, is a threat to a company's strategic plan
a sufficiently reasonable basis under Unocal for defending against a non-
coercive tender offer?247 Finally, what non-shareholder constituencies
may directors consider, and when may directors consider these constitu-
encies at the expense of shareholder desires?24
III. PROBLEMS WITH BUSINESS JUDGMENT RULE PROTECTION OF
CONTROL DECISIONS
The Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co.249 proportionality test250
and the Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings251 auction duties
tiously applied lest the important benefits of the business judgment rule... be eroded or lost
by slow degrees." Id. at 93,284-85.
243. Time, No. 284, 1989, slip op. at 38 ("It is not until both parts of the Unocal inquiry
have been satisfied that the business judgment rule attaches to defensive actions of a board of
directors.").
244. The court noted that the directors were "adequately informed of the potential benefits
of a transaction with Paramount." Id. at 37. The court also found that the legitimacy of the
board's failure to negotiate with Paramount was "materially enhanced by the fact that twelve
of Time's sixteen board members were outside independent directors." Id. at 38.
245. The court recognized as legitimate the purported concern, of Time's board that "Time
shareholders might elect to tender into Paramount's cash offer in ignorance or a mistaken
belief of the strategic benefit which a business combination with Warner might produce." Id.
at 36. (emphasis added). The court failed, however, to recognize that the Time-Warner merger
was the transaction endorsed by Time's directors, and that it was the directors' responsibility
to convince the shareholders of the merits of that transaction.
246. See infra notes 277-381 and accompanying text.
247. See infra notes 382-417 and accompanying text.
248. See infra notes 463-500 and accompanying text.
249. 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985).
250. See supra notes 150-56 and accompanying text for a discussion of this test.
251. 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1986).
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test 252 are the two primary tests applied to determine whether the busi-
ness judgment rule will protect corporate control decisions. A court's
decision to apply one of these tests rather than the other may be outcome
determinative because Revlon calls for a greater degree of judicial scru-
tiny than Unocal.253 Protection of the business judgment rule under Rev-
lon requires directors to focus exclusively on shareholder wealth
maximization, 254 whereas the more lenient Unocal test allows a broad
range of director considerations and requires only that directors act rea-
sonably and in good faith.2 5
Problems resulting from business judgment rule protection of corpo-
rate control decisions made by directors fall into two broad categories-
practical considerations and theoretical considerations. 25 6 Courts have
been unable to practicably and consistently define director responsibili-
ties in takeover contexts257 partly because of an inability to define what
Revlon and Unocal require, and when either of these levels of responsibil-
ity is required. 258 As a result, courts have significantly deferred to the
business judgment of directors, virtually eliminating any meaningful judi-
cial scrutiny.2 9 Besides practical difficulties in applying Revlon and
Unocal, in theory, the business judgment rule should not apply in control
contests because directors' objectivity is unavoidably impaired.260 Under
these circumstances, deference to target directors is inappropriate.261
A. What Does Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings
Require?
In In re RJR Nabisco Shareholders Litigation,262 the RJR board put
252. See supra notes 185-88 and accompanying text for a discussion of this test.
253. AC Acquisitions Corp. v. Anderson, Clayton & Co. 519 A.2d 103, 111 (Del. Ch. 1986)
("determination of the appropriate standard of judicial review frequently is [outcome-]determi-
native"); see also Revlon, 506 A.2d at 182 ("[R]ecognition that [a target] company [is] for sale
... significantly alter[s] the board's responsibilities under the Unocal standards.").
254. Revlon, 506 A.2d at 182.
255. Unocal, 493 A.2d at 955. See also supra notes 150-56 and accompanying text.
256. See infra notes 262-440 and accompanying text.
257. See infra notes 262-417 and accompanying text for a discussion and analysis of this
problem.
258. See S. LORNE, supra note 38, at § 1A.05[l]-[4].
259. See Paramount Communications, Inc. v. Time Inc., No. 284, 1989 (Del. Feb. 26,
1990). See infra notes 320-81 and accompanying text for a discussion of the limited judicial
scrutiny applied in Time.
260. Unocal, 493 A.2d at 954.
261. See infra notes 418-46 and accompanying text for a discussion and analysis of this
problem.
262. [1988-1989 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 94,194 (Del. Ch. Jan. 31),
appeal denied mem., 556 A.2d 1070 (Del. 1989).
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RJR on the auction block.263 All parties conceded that Revlon, Inc. v.
MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings264 applied,265 but the Delaware Chan-
cery Court was left to decide what Revlon "auction duties" required.266
Ultimately, the duties required were significantly less than what Revlon
seems to mandate. Revlon explicitly states that "when bidders make rela-
tively similar offers, or dissolution of the company becomes inevitable,
the directors cannot ... playl-J favorites. 2 67 In RJR Nabisco, however,
the Delaware court retreated from Revlon, stating a "level playing field"
is not required as long as directors act in good faith.2 6
8
The RJR directors were faced with two substantially equivalent
bids-one offered by RIR management and the other by the investment
firm, Kohlberg Kravis Roberts & Co. (KKR).269 The management bid
offered more cash than KKR's, yet RJR's board rejected that bid in
favor of KKR's bid.27° According to the court, RJR's directors were not
required to accept management's equivalent bid which included a greater
cash component than KKR's opposing bid, nor were they required to
enhance the bidding process by trying to "break the tie."2'' Yet Revlon's
focus on shareholder wealth maximization would seem to require that at
least one of these actions be taken. 72
Besides rejecting plaintiffs' Revlon arguments, the court also disre-
garded allegations of improper board motivation,27 3 finding instead that
263. Id. at 91,714.
264. 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1986).
265. RJR Nabisco, [1988-1989 Transfer Binder] Fed. See. L. Rep. (CCH) V 94,194, at
91,714.
266. Id. at 91,714-15.
267. Revlon, 506 A.2d at 184. The court noted that favoritism is justifiable only when: (1)
similar bids are not offered and dissolution of the company is not inevitable, and (2) "the
[hostile bidder's] offer adversely affects shareholder interests .... " Id.
268. RJR Nabisco, [1988-1989 Transfer Binder] Fed. See. L. Rep. (CCH) % 94,194, at
91,714. See also In re Fort Howard Corp. Shareholders Litig., No. 9991, at 40 (Del. Ch. Aug.
8, 1988) (LEXIS, States library, Del file) (board "may favor one [bidder] over another if in
good faith and advisedly it believes shareholder interests would be thereby advanced"); West
Point-Pepperell, Inc. v. J.P. Stevens & Co., 542 A.2d 770, 782 (Del. Ch. 1988) ("[T]he board
may tilt the playing field if, but only if, it is in the shareholders' interests to do so."). But see In
re Holly Farms Corp. Shareholders Litig., [1988-1989 Transfer Binder] Fed. See. L. Rep.
(CCH) 94,181, at 91,644 (Del. Ch. Dec. 30, 1988) ("Even if the [b]oard thought it was acting
in good faith, the [auction] process itself was so substantially flawed that the [b]oard's actions
... cannot be viewed as rational.").
269. RJR Nabisco, [1988-1989 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) % 94,194, at
91,701.
270. Id. at 91,713.
271. Id.
272. Revlon, 506 A.2d at 182. See also supra notes 185-88 and accompanying text for a
discussion of the wealth-maximization focus of Revlon.
273. RJR Nabisco, [1988-1989 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 94,194, at
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the RJR board did not act "grossly negligent. ' 274 In assessing the rea-
sonableness of the board's decision, the court appears to have applied the
more lenient Unocal standard, rather than the stricter shareholder-
wealth-maximization test of Revlon.25 Other recent cases have similarly
retreated from the shareholder-wealth-maximization test, focusing in-
stead on the absence of directors' bad faith.2 76
B. Avoiding Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings Duties
by Maintaining a "Goal" of Corporate Independence
The triggering point for application of the strict requirements of
Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings2 7 hinges on the "inevita-
bility of a change in control, ' 2 78 a phrase not defined by the Revlon
court. The Revlon court noted, however, that an inevitable change in
control is not limited to circumstances of an active auction resulting from
directors putting the company up for sale.279 Courts subsequent to Rev-
lon have placed great weight on a corporation's goal of "remaining in-
dependent,, 28 ° but generally, mere articulation of a goal to remain
independent has not been sufficient to avoid Revlon auction duties.28'
Courts, prior to Paramount Communications, Inc. v. Time Inc.,282
seemed to require a company desiring independence to ensure that a ma-
jority of ownership control remains with existing shareholders. 2 3 Thus,
91,701-02. The RJR directors were allegedly motivated by a desire to disassociate themselves
from the management plan because of the "harsh [public] criticism [it] engendered." Id. at
91,702. For example, Time magazine trumpeted the management proposal as "A Game of
Greed." Id. at 91,711 n.14.
274. Id. at 91,703.
275. Id. at 91,714-15 (court interpreted Revlon as not applicable where directors act in good
faith, and therefore, found no basis in Revlon to overturn board's decision).
276. See, e.g., West Point-Pepperell, 542 A.2d at 782 ("level playing field" not required in
auction if directors act with due care); In re Fort Howard, No. 9991 (Del. Ch. Aug. 8, 1988)
(LEXIS, States library, Del file) (board "may favor one [bidder] over another if in good faith
and advisedly it believes shareholder interests would be thereby advanced"); Citron v.
Fairchild Camera & Instrument Corp., [1988-1989 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
93,915, at 90,103 n.17 (Del. Ch. May 19, 1988) (Revlon duty not to get best price but to
strive in good faith to get best available transaction).
277. 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1986).
278. Id. at 182. See also Ivanhoe Partners v. Newmont Mining Corp., 535 A.2d 1334, 1345
(Del. 1987) (Revlon applies only if sale "inevitable").
279. Revlon, 506 A.2d at 181-82. A change in control may also occur where there is a
"merger or buyout with a third party." Id. at 182.
280. See, e.g., Black & Decker Corp. v. American Standard, Inc., 682 F. Supp. 772 (D. Del.
1988); Ivanhoe, 535 A.2d 1334.
281. See Black & Decker, 682 F. Supp. at 784.
282. No. 284, 1989 (Del. Feb. 26, 1990).
283. See Ivanhoe, 535 A.2d at 1345.
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a fifty-percent cut-off test 284 was applied to determine whether a change
in majority ownership occurred in Ivanhoe Partners v. Newmont Mining
Corp. 285 and Black & Decker Corp. v. American Standard, Inc.2" 6 This
fifty-percent test, however, may have been limited or abandoned in Time,
in which the court suggested that a company cannot involuntarily enter
the "Revlon mode.
2 87
In Ivanhoe, the Newmont board faced an unwanted takeover threat
and articulated its goal to remain "independent. 288 To further this goal,
Newmont declared a $33 per share cash dividend.28 9 Payment of this
dividend allowed Gold Fields, a favored Newmont shareholder, to en-
gage in a "street sweep" 29 of Newmont stock and increase its ownership
from twenty-six percent to just under fifty percent.29 Newmont facili-
tated the street sweep, but assured its independence by entering into an
agreement limiting Gold Fields' equity ownership of Newmont to just
under fifty percent and its board representation to forty percent.292
Ivanhoe, a hostile bidder, sued to enjoin or rescind Newmont's plan,
arguing that the Newmont directors failed to fulfill their Revlon auction
duties.293 The Delaware Supreme Court, however, agreed with
Newmont in its conclusion that limiting Gold Fields' equity ownership
and board representation to under fifty percent ensured that a change in
284. A 50% cut-off test assumes a change in control when over half of the company's shares
outstanding change hands. This 50% cut-off is somewhat artificial because a shareholder own-
ing significantly less than 50% of voting shares can still effectively maintain working control
over company operations through executive officer or board representation. See Easterbrook
& Fischel, Corporate Control Transactions, 91 YALE L.J. 698, 705 (1982). See also Rule 405
accompanying the Securities Act of 1933, which defines "control" as "the possession, direct or
indirect, of the power to direct or cause the direction of the management and policies...
through ownership of voting securities, by contract, or otherwise." 17 C.F.R. § 230.405 (1989)
(emphasis added).
285. 535 A.2d 1334 (Del. 1987).
286. 682 F. Supp. 772 (D. Del. 1988).
287. See Time, No. 284, 1989, slip op. at 27-28. See also infra notes 309-42 and accompany-
ing text.
288. Ivanhoe, 535 A.2d at 1336-37.
289. Id. at 1337.
290. "'Street sweep' refers to the rapid acquisition of securities on the open market during
and shortly after the pendency of a tender offer for the same class of securities." Id. at 1337
n.3. The dividend paid by Newmont provided cash which enabled Gold Fields to purchase
Newmont shares at a premium and allowed Newmont to keep its shares in "friendly" hands.
Id. at 1344. In addition to facilitating Gold Field's street sweep, the cash dividend, financed
through asset sales, reduced Newmont's attractiveness to potential bidders by reducing its
asset base and its liquidity. Id. at 1339-40.
291. Id. at 1337.
292. Id. at 1340.
293. Id.
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control would not occur,2 94 and therefore Revlon did not apply.29 The
court limited its review of Newmont's defensive cash dividend to Uno-
cal's proportionality analysis296 and allowed business judgment rule pro-
tection of the board's plan.2 97 In applying Unocal, the Ivanhoe court
found that Ivanhoe's bid was inadequate and coercive, and therefore,
presented a reasonably perceived threat to Newmont shareholders.298
The court also found that Newmont's actions in facilitating the street
sweep were reasonable and in the shareholders' best interests.2 99
The target company in Black & Decker, similar to the target com-
pany in Ivanhoe, articulated a goal to remain independent; however, the
court in this case applied Revlon rather than Unocal.300 In Black &
Decker, American Standard was the target of a hostile offer by Black &
Decker.301 In pursuit of the goal of maintaining independence,30 2 Amer-
ican Standard's directors approved implementation of a recapitalization
plan which involved exchanging outstanding equity shares for cash plus a
small equity stub.30 3 As part of this plan, equity shares owned by Ameri-
can Standard's management were to be purchased by an employee stock
ownership plan (ESOP) controlled by American Standard manage-
ment.3 4 Upon consummation of the recapitalization plan, the combined
ownership of American Standard management and the ESOP would to-
tal 54.5% of American Standard's outstanding equity shares, and public
ownership would be reduced to 45.5%.305 As in Ivanhoe, the Delaware
court considered the target company's intent in light of the percentage of
voting shares transferred.30 6  American Standard's management con-
trolled the ESOP; therefore, the court found that the ultimate effect of
294. Id. at 1345.
295. Id. See also supra notes 185-88 and accompanying text for a discussion of Revlon-level
scrutiny.
296. Ivanhoe, 535 A.2d at 1342-43. See supra notes 150-56 and accompanying text for ex-
planation of the Unocal analysis.
297. Ivanhoe, 535 A.2d at 1345.
298. Id. at 1342.
299. Id. at 1343.
300. Black & Decker, 682 F. Supp. at 782. The court distinguished the facts in Ivanhoe
Partners from those in Black & Decker, noting that while the management of both target
companies articulated goals of maintaining independence, the target company in Black &
Decker sought to maintain its independence "only through a change in control." Id.
301. Id. at 774.
302. Id. at 780.
303. Id. at 782. An equity "stub" represents a fractional ownership share, that combined




306. Id. The court noted that under the proposed arrangement, "public shareholders
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the plan was to transfer ownership of American Standard from the pub-
lic's hands to those of its management.3 "7 The court concluded that a
"change in control" had occurred and accordingly required imposition of
Revlon auction duties to maximize shareholder wealth.30 8
In Time, the Delaware Supreme Court may have abandoned, or at
least redefined, the fifty-percent cut-off test applied in Ivanhoe and Black
& Decker. Similar to Ivanhoe and Black & Decker, the Time court con-
sidered the target's desire to remain independent. 30 9 The Time directors
had articulated a goal to remain independent and preserve Time's "role
in American life."'310 Unlike Ivanhoe Partners and Black & Decker, how-
ever, the court did not focus exclusively on the percentage of shares
changing hands, but rather focused on the subjective intent of the Time
directors.311
Under the initial Time-Warner merger agreement,312 a change in
both voting and management control seemed inevitable. Warner share-
holders would have owned sixty-two percent of previously outstanding
Time common shares,313 and management of the combined company
would have been shared equally between the previously independent
management teams of Time and Warner.31 '4  Nevertheless, the Time
court held that Revlon did not apply.
315
In Time, the Delaware Supreme Court refocused the issue of
whether Revlon applies, from, "Is a fundamental change in the com-
pany's ownership or capital structure inevitable?" to, "Is giving the
would own 45.5% of the outstanding common stock, management would own 23.9% and...
[the] ESOP would control 30.6% [effectively giving management 54.5% ownership]." Id.
307. Id. at 783.
308. Id. at 784.
309. Time, No. 284, 1989, slip op. at 14. See also the chancery court's opinion which
stated:
Neither the goal of establishing a vertically integrated entertainment organization,
nor the goal of becoming a more global enterprise, was a transcendent aim of Time
management or its board. More important to both, apparently, has been a desire to
maintain an independent Time incorporated that reflected a continuation of what
management and the board regarded as distinctive and important "Time culture."
Paramount Communications, Inc. v. Time Inc., [1989 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH) 94,514, at 93,267 (Del. Ch. July 14, 1989), affid, No. 284, 1989 (Del. Feb. 26, 1990).
310. Time, [1989 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 94,514, at 93,267.
311. See Time, No. 284, 1989, slip op. at 27. The court concluded that there was insuffi-
cient "evidence to conclude that Time's board, in negotiating with Warner, made dissolution
or break up of the corporate entity inevitable ...." Id.
312. See supra notes 190-245 and accompanying text for a discussion of the initial Time-
Warner merger agreement and the sequence of events giving rise to this litigation.
313. Time, [1989 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCII) 94,514, at 93,270.
314. Id. at 93,269.
315. Time, No. 284, 1989, slip op. at 29.
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shareholders the option to accept an all-cash tender offer inconsistent
with the company's strategic plan?" '16 In so doing, the Delaware
Supreme Court has rendered Revlon useless. Under the Revlon rule, as
previously applied in Revlon and in cases prior to Time, courts focused
on whether the directors planned a change in the fundamental structure
of the company.317 This reasoning is consistent with the statutory provi-
sions dividing corporate powers between directors and shareholders;
318
directors are charged with managing the business and affairs of the com-
pany 319 and the shareholders are responsible for decisions affecting the
corporation's ultimate destiny.320
The intended focus of Revlon was to ensure shareholder protection
once a change in the fundamental structure of a corporation became in-
evitable.321 Assuming that corporate decision-making powers lie on a
continuum between those delegated to directors and those delegated to
shareholders, a decision which changes the fundamental structure of a
corporation lies closer to the shareholders' powers of "ultimate destiny"
than to the director's powers. The Revlon court recognized that when a
change in corporate structure is pending, the company is "no longer
faced [with] threats to [existing] corporate policy or effectiveness ' 322 and
that under such circumstances, the potential for abuse by the directors
increases. Therefore, when a change in the corporation's fundamental
structure is inevitable, directors should be required to pay greater atten-
tion to shareholder desires than what is required under Unocal.
In Revlon, the Delaware Supreme Court focused on whether a fun-
damental structure of the company was inevitable. The court defined the
circumstances which change the fundamental structure of a company as
those involving either an inevitable "break-up [or dissolution] of the
company"3 23 or a "boardfl authoriz[ation] ... to negotiate a merger or
316. Id. at 25.
317. See, eg., Revlon, 506 A.2d at 181 (shareholder-wealth maximization duties may arise
in corporate restructurings where fundamental change in the capital structure of the target
company occurs); Ivanhoe, 535 A.2d at 1345 (fundamental change in the ownership
structure).
318. See supra notes 14-19 and accompanying text.
319. DEL. STAT. ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a) (1983).
320. Norlin Corp. v. Rooney, Pace Inc., 744 F.2d 255, 258 (2d Cir. 1984). For examples of
such "ultimate destiny" decisions requiring shareholder vote see DEL. STAT. ANN. tit. 8,
§ 211 (shareholder vote required for election of directors); id. § 241(b) (shareholder vote re-
quired to amend articles of incorporation); id. § 251(c) (shareholder vote required for merger
or consolidation) (Supp. 1988).
321. The Revlon court stated that the duty of a board is "maximization of the company's
value at a sale for the stockholders' benefit." 506 A.2d at 187 (emphasis added).




buyout with a third party" '3 24 Revlon's definitions of when a fundamen-
tal change in company structure occurs were applied in Ivanhoe and
Black & Decker. In Ivanhoe, the directors ensured that a fundamental
change in corporate structure would not occur, and the court, therefore,
held that Revlon did not apply.325 In Black & Decker, a fundamental
change in the corporate structure did occur when ownership control
shifted from investors in the open market to management.326 In this situ-
ation, Revlon was applied.327
These same Revlon triggering points, however, were ignored in
Time. In Time, the board gave management the "go-ahead" to discuss
the possibility of a merger with Warner,328 and Revlon was not trig-
gered. 29 When the boards of Time and Warner signed the merger agree-
ment, which transferred a majority of Time's voting control to Warner
shareholders and half of Time's management control to Warner manage-
ment, Revlon scrutiny again was not triggered.33° Even after Paramount
launched its tender offer and Time directors further considered alterna-
tive merger and buyout opportunities, 331 the Time court again held that
Revlon did not apply.332
Contrary to courts' focus on objective criteria, such as changes in
the corporate structure and ownership control, the Time court focused
on the subjective intent of the Time directors.333 Prior to Time, courts
had questioned whether it was possible for "a board to thrust itself invol-
untarily into a Revlon [mode].1 3 34 The Delaware Supreme Court in
Time answered "no." The court restricted application of Revlon duties
324. Id.
325. Ivanhoe, 535 A.2d at 1345.
326. In Black & Decker, the target company's recapitalization plan provided that all out-
standing shares were to be exchanged for a $59.00 cash distribution and a debt and securities
package. Black & Decker, 682 F. Supp. at 787. The reduction of equity and increase in debt
fundamentally changed the capital structure of American Standard. In addition, transfer of
shares to management through the ESOP changed the ownership control structure of Ameri-
can Standard. Id.
327. Id. at 784. The Black & Decker court distinguished Ivanhoe from the facts of this case,
noting that "management ha[d] said it want[ed] to remain independent, yet its actions re-
veal[ed] that the company [was] for sale." Id.
328. Time, No. 284, 1989, slip op. at 10.
329. Id. at 29.
330. Id.
331. Id. at 30 n.16.
332. Id. at 30.
333. Id. at 14. The court noted that "Time steadfastly maintained it was not placing itself
up for sale." Id.
334. TW Servs., Inc. v. SWT Acquisition Corp., [1988-1989 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L.
Rep. (CCH) 94,334, at 92,179-80 (Del. Ch. Mar. 2, 1989).
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to two narrow circumstances: 335 (1) "when a corporation initiates an
active bidding process seeking to sell itself or to effect a business reorgan-
ization involving a clear break-up of the company; ' 336 and (2) "where, in
response to a bidder's offer, a target abandons its long-term strategy and
seeks an alternative transaction also involving the break up of the
company.
'337
Each of the two "Revlon circumstances," as defined by the Delaware
Supreme Court in Time, requires either directors' subjective intent or an
actual plan to sell or dismantle the company. The first Revlon circum-
stance requires the board to initiate an active bidding contest and the
second requires abandonment of the company's long-term strategy and a
management plan to break up the company.338 If subjective intent or
knowledge is required, the companies cannot "involuntarily" fall into the
Revlon mode. Therefore, the circumstances in which Revlon is most
likely to benefit shareholders-the cases in which management adopts a
plan which perpetuates its own control at the expense of shareholders-
will not invoke Revlon.
For example, if, after Time, circumstances identical to Black &
Decker arise, a result opposite from that in Black & Decker will be
reached. In Black & Decker, the target directors wanted to maintain the
company's independence.339 In fact, the ESOP transaction was struc-
tured to ensure the company's independence by providing for target
management to achieve voting control of the company.340 The transac-
tion planned by the target company, American Standard, did not involve
an active bidding contest, nor did it involve an abandonment of the com-
pany's desire to remain independent and a break up of the company.
Yet, these appear to be the only two circumstances which will give rise to
Revlon after Time.
Target management in Black & Decker was, however, clearly per-
335. Time, No. 284, 1989, slip op. at 28-29. The court noted, however, that other possibili-
ties for triggering Revlon were not foreclosed. Id. at 27. Given the narrow focus adopted by
the Time court, such possibilities are difficult to imagine.
336. Id. at 23.
337. Id.
338. Id. at 28. The court further clarified its restrictions on application of Revlon, noting
that if a "board's reaction to a hostile tender offer is found to constitute only a defensive
response and not abandonment of the corporation's continued existence, Revlon duties are not
triggered .... ." Id.
339. Black & Decker, 682 F. Supp. at 780.
340. Id. at 784. The court noted that "the shareholders [were] acceding control in the
corporation... [and] management [was] availing [itself] of the takeover threat to increase their
... ownership in the company." Id.
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petuating its own self-interest at the expense of the shareholders.341 Yet
after Time, if the same circumstances were to arise, Revlon would not be
triggered because the directors of American Standard did not have a sub-
jective intent to put the company up for sale. Given the low level of
scrutiny called for under Unocal, directors who approve a defensive plan,
need only show that they acted reasonably to reduce or eliminate some
threat.342 Under Unocal, the ESOP transaction approved by American
Standard's directors would have been upheld. The utility of Revlon's
shareholder wealth-maximization requirement is demonstrated in Black
& Decker, where the target directors were forced to maximize the share-
holders' wealth, rather than their own wealth. Revlon's usefulness can
also be seen through analysis of what a court applying Revlon to the facts
of Time should have concluded.
Had Revlon been applied, Time directors would have been obligated
to maximize shareholder wealth.34 3 Presumably, this would require
choosing between two alternative transactions:3" (1) Paramount's all-
cash, all-shares acquisition of Time, under which Time shareholders
would receive $200 cash per share,34 ' or (2) Time's junk-bond-financed
acquisition of Warner, under which Time shareholders would own shares
in the combined Time-Warner company. 34  Revlon's shareholder-
wealth-maximization requirement 347 would have obligated the Time di-
rectors to consider which deal would have been best for the Time share-
holders.348 In determining the "best deal," Time's directors would have
341. American Standard's management gave itself control rather than allowing the share-
holders to realize the significant cash premium offered by the outside bidder. Black & Decker,
682 F. Supp. at 784.
342. See Time, No. 284, 1989, slip op. at 41. See supra notes 272-381 and accompanying
text for a discussion of how Time limits Unocal, and how the Delaware Supreme Court applied
Unocal to the circumstances in Time.
343. Revlon, 493 A.2d at 182. See supra notes 185-88 and accompanying text for a discus-
sion of Revlon's focus on shareholder wealth maximization.
344. Although choosing between the two transactions was not a legal necessity, it was a
practical and economic necessity. See Time, [1989 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)II
94,514, at 93,280.
345. Time, No. 284, 1989, slip op. at 23.
346. Id. at 22. The court noted that recasting Time's transaction with Warner caused Time
to "assume 7-10 billion dollars worth of debt, thus eliminating one of the principal transaction-
related benefits of the original merger agreement." Id. Time's directors would have to choose
one over the other because implementation of both deals would not be economically feasible.
Id. at 30. The court noted, however, that acquisition of a combined Time-Warner company
would not be impossible. Id.
347. See supra notes 262-76 and accompanying text for a discussion of what Revlon may (or
may not) require.
348. This analysis is speculative, however, because it is performed in hindsight and the
actual long-term benefit (or detriment) of Time's decision will not be recognized for years to
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had to assess, among other things, the relative degree of coercion im-
posed by each transaction.349
A takeover bid may involve procedural or substantive coercion.350
Moreover, at least according to the Delaware Supreme Court in Time, an
otherwise non-coercive takeover bid may nonetheless threaten a com-
pany's strategic plan.351 Paramount avoided procedural coercion by of-
fering the same cash price to all Time shareholders. 352 On the other
hand, Time's transaction with Warner arguably may have procedurally
coerced Time shareholders if it was designed to manipulate the corporate
machinery and avoid a shareholder vote.353  Time directors initially
planned a merger with Warner, which would have required a share-
holder vote.354 Time's board of directors had unanimously approved the
merger agreement, which it trumpeted because it did not follow the trend
towards greater leverage,355 and it had scheduled a shareholder vote. 6
The board later withdrew its approval when Paramount's offer was re-
come. See Time, [1989 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) % 94,514, at 93,284 ("the
Time board may be proven in time to have been brilliantly prescient or dismayingly wrong").
349. Usually under Revlon, directors choose between competing offers each of which pro-
vides an immediate return to shareholders. See, e.g., Revlon, 506 A.2d at 177-78 (hostile
tender offer or buyout by white knight); In re RJR Nabisco Shareholders Litig., [1988-1989
Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) % 94,194, at 91,701 (Del. Ch. Jan. 31) (management
bid or outside bid), appeal denied mem., 556 A.2d 1070 (1989). In these cases, consideration
of future threats posed is not relevant because shareholder wealth maximization involves a
short-term, immediate result. See supra notes 262-76 and accompanying text for a discussion
of RJR. Contrary to these cases, however, Time involved two competing proposals, one offer-
ing an immediate return to shareholders and the other offering the future value of a combined
Time-Warner company. Time, No. 284, 1989, slip op. at 25-26. Therefore, consideration of
future threats posed is necessary to evaluate the ultimate value to Time shareholders of the
Time-Warner combination. See supra notes 75-115 and accompanying text for a discussion of
threats that takeovers pose to target corporations.
350. See City Capital Assocs. Ltd. Partnership v. Interco Inc., 551 A.2d 787, 797 (Del.
Ch.), appeal dismissed, 556 A.2d 1070 (Del. 1989). See also supra notes 75-115 and accompa-
nying text.
351. Time, slip op. at 36-37. See infra notes 382-417 for a discussion of the court's consid-
eration of Time's strategic plan.
352. Time, slip op. at 5.
353. This argument was not specifically addressed by the supreme court, however, the
chancery court dismissed the argument on an allocation-of-powers theory. Time, [1989 Trans-
fer Binder] Fed. See. L. Rep. (CCII) % 94,514, at 93,281. The chancery court reasoned that
because a shareholder vote on the initial merger agreement was required by the New York
Stock Exchange rules only, and not by federal or state statutes, Time shareholders had no legal
grounds to complain that their rights had been infringed. Id. at 93,381 n.18.
354. Time, No. 284, 1989, slip op. at 15.
355. Id. at 22 (one of the principal benefits of the merger was the lack of debt). The court
also noted that "Time representatives lauded the lack of debt to the United States Senate and
to the President of the United States. Public reaction to the announcement of the merger was
positive. Time-Warner would be a media colossus with international scope." Id. at 17-18.
356. Time, [1989 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCI-) t 94,514, at 93,271.
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ceived.357 Time directors admitted that they revised the transaction with
Warner only because the needed shareholder vote became
"problematic."35
The Delaware Supreme Court rejected the plaintiffs' argument that
"Time's board ...by entering into its initial merger agreement with
Warner [came] under a Revlon duty either to auction the company or to
maximize shareholder value. . . ."" The lower court had, in its opin-
ion, clarified the reasoning behind permitting Time's directors to with-
draw the merger proposal from shareholder consideration. 3" The
plaintiffs had argued that the original Time-Warner merger required
both director and shareholder approval and that once solicitation of
shareholder vote had commenced, the ultimate decision rested in the
hands of the shareholders.361 Therefore, they argued, directors could not
withdraw their approval simply because a "shareholder vote seemed des-
tined to go against management." '362 In rejecting this argument, the
lower court looked at the directors' role, rather than the shareholders'
role, and found that a merger could not be accomplished without director
approval.3 63 Because directors' approval was a condition precedent to
the merger transaction, the court reasoned that Time's board could legit-
imately withdraw its approval, regardless of shareholder desires. 3 1
Substantive coercion typically involves an inadequate amount or
quality of consideration.365 In Time, Paramount offered cash considera-
tion, not low-grade securities.366 Moreover, the plaintiffs seeking to en-
join the Warner transaction and pursue the Paramount deal included
357. Id. at 93,272.
358. Id.
359. Time, No. 284, 1989, slip op. at 5. The chancery court, in its opinion, had also noted
that "commitment of the original Warner transaction to a shareholder vote [did not give] rise
to a fiduciary obligation [on the part of Time's directors] to permit shareholders to decide the
matter." Time, [1989 Transfer Binder] Fed. See. L. Rep. (CCII) 94,514, at 93,278. The
chancery court distinguished Blasius Indus., Inc. v. Atlas Corp., 564 A.2d 651 (Del. Ch. 1988)
from Time, commenting that "a board resolution rescinding approval of an agreement of
merger and removing the matter from the agenda [as in Time] ... is altogether different from a
resolution designed to interfere with the statutory power to act through consent [as in Bla-
sius]." Id.
360. Time, [1989 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 94,514, at 93,281.
361. Id.
362. Id. This argument was not specifically addressed by the Delaware Supreme Court.
363. Id. at 93,281.
364. Id.
365. City Capital, 551 A.2d at 797. See supra notes 99-115 and accompanying text for a
discussion of substantive coercion.
366. Time, [1989 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 94,514, at 93,271. Subse-
quent to its initial offer for $175 per share, Paramount made a $200 per share cash offer. Id. at
93,275.
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Time shareholders.367 Therefore, it would be difficult to argue that Para-
mount's offer was substantively unfair. On the other hand, Time's acqui-
sition of Warner, though considered "friendly," '368 resulted in many of
the harmful aspects of debt-financed hostile takeovers upon which direc-
tors often justify their defensive actions.369 The Time-Warner deal,
therefore, could be considered substantively unfair.
Time's acquisition of Warner was achieved through junk-bond fi-
nancing,370 which is considered riskier and less valuable than bank or
other financing. 371 The typical fears arising from junk-bond financing
include: (1) increased risk of default;3 72 (2) a threat that a "bust-up" of
company operations may be necessary to pay debt costs; 373 and, (3) an
expectation that restrictive debt covenants and increased interest ex-
penses will limit the company's ability to operate competitively in the
future.374 Each of these fears came to light as a result of Time's acquisi-
tion of Warner.
First, Time's debt has been downgraded by Standard & Poor's,
37 5
resulting in Time being labeled a "junk bond company. 3 76 In addition,
Time's future business activities have been severely confined by restric-
tive covenants accompanying its acquisition-debt agreements.377 Finally,
Time has identified over $1.3 billion of assets that it might sell to support
debt costs associated with its acquisition of Warner.378 Not only was
Paramount's transaction better from an immediate profit-maximization
367. Id. at 93,265.
368. Id. at 93,270 (directors of both Time and Warner unanimously approved the
transaction).
369.. See infra notes 370-81 and accompanying text.
370. See Time, [1989 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CC-) t 94,514, at 93,274.
371. Buffett, Dingman, Gray & Lowenstein, supra note 88, at 11.
372. Id.
373. Id. at 12 (Junk-bond financed takeovers are abusive because they "break apart compa-
nies as opposed to putting them together .... [T]he entire junk bond issue is based upon what,
in a predetermined manner will result from selling off pieces .... [T]he junk bond takeover
restricts the ability of the affected business to grow or to provide increased productivity and
employment."); see also Coffee, Shareholders Versus Managers: The Strain in the Corporate
Web, in KNIGHTS, RAIDERS AND TARGETS 77, 116 n.3 (1988) ("[P]lans to dismantle the
target and sell its assets in piecemeal fashion to third parties are often in place even before the
takeover has succeeded.").
374. Buffett, Dingman, Gray & Lowenstein, supra note 88, at 12.
375. Time Warner Inc.'s Senior Debt Rating is Lowered by S&P, Wall St. J., Oct. 2, 1989, at
C9, col. 4.
376. Id.
377. Time's debt agreements have limited Time's ability to pay future dividends, borrow
additional funds and expand through future investments. TIME WARNER INC., QUARTERLY
REPORT ON FORM 10-Q 8 (June 30, 1989) [hereinafter TIME WARNER 10-Q].
378. Richter, Time Warner Details Plans to Pay for Takeover, L.A. Times, Aug. 24, 1989,
Part IV, at 1, col. 1.
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viewpoint, the Time-Warner deal will undoubtedly restrict Time
Warner's future ability to operate competitively and realize its long-term
profit potential.37 9 Although the Time directors claimed to put forth the
best deal for Time and its shareholders, it is difficult to understand their
decision on purely economic terms.380
Had the Time court applied Revlon's shareholder-wealth-maximiza-
tion analysis, rather than the more lenient Unocal analysis, it would have
likely reached a different result.381
C. Is Pursuit of a Strategic Plan an Interest Protectable Under
Unocal?
After rejecting application of Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes
Holdings,382 which application may or may not have resulted in a differ-
ent outcome, the Paramount Communications, Inc. v. Time Inc. 383 court
performed a Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co.
384 analysis. 385
The Delaware Chancery Court found that the first prong of Unocal
was satisfied by the Time directors reasonably perceiving that Para-
mount's tender offer posed a threat to Time's long-term strategic plan.386
The court reasoned that if Paramount's tender offer was successful, Time
would be precluded from consummating a transaction with Warner, and
379. See Kneale, Time Warner Had 4th-Period Loss of $222 Million; Debt Costs Cited, Wall
St. J., Feb. 13, 1990, at B6, col. 1 (Time Warner has been unable to generate adequate cash to
pay acquisition debt costs and Wall Street had not increased its value assessment of Time
Warner); Sandier, Time Warner's Mega-Issues Receive Miniscule Reviews, Wall St. J., Jan. 3,
1990, at C2, col. 4 (reason Time Warner's stock value may never achieve its full potential is
because "Time Warner now has a post-merger stock with a ton of debt on top of it, and not
much immediate prospect of being taken over"). But see Marcial, Two-for-one Plums Ripe for
the Picking, Bus. WEEK, Feb. 26, 1990, at 92 (citing investment banker's report concluding
that Time Warner's underlying value is expected to grow 20% annually, and its underlying
assets may be worth $330 per share in 1993).
380. See infra notes 382-417 and accompanying text for a discussion of non-economic inter-
ests considered by Time's board.
381. Keep in mind, however, that this analysis is speculative only. See supra note 349. The
Delaware Chancery Court justified its deference to Time's board by noting that "[n]o one...
has access to more information concerning the corporation's present and future condition"
than the company's board. Time, [1989 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 94,514, at
93,277. The court referred to the triumph of The Walt Disney Co. which, in 1984, rejected a
$72.50 per share hostile tender offer, and now trades at an equivalent per share value of $380.
Id.
382. 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1986).
383. No. 284, 1989 (Del. Feb. 26, 1990).
384. 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985).
385. Time, No. 284, 1989, slip op. at 31.
386. Paramount Communications, Inc. v. Time Inc., [1989 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L.
Rep. (CCH) S 94,514, at 93,282 (Del. Ch. July 14, 1989), aff'd, No. 284, 1989 (Del. Feb. 26,
1990).
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that the revised Warner transaction, "even though 'reactive' in important
respects, had its origin and central purpose in bonafide strategic business
planning .... .-3" The chancery court had concluded that "achievement
of the long-term strategic plan of the Time-Warner consolidation [was]
plainly a most important corporate policy ''388 and that this corporate
policy was a "legally cognizable interest.
'38 9
The Delaware Supreme Court, however, refused to limit director
discretion to protect only long-term plans.390 This court stressed the flex-
ibility of Unocal,39I noting that the "precepts underlying the business
judgment rule mitigate against a court's engaging in the process of at-
tempting to appraise and evaluate the relative merits of a long-term ver-
sus a short-term investment goal for shareholders. ' 392 The supreme
court then attempted to articulate the precise threat posed by Para-
mount's offer.393 The court recognized one concern of Time's board-
that "shareholders might elect to tender into Paramount's cash offer in
ignorance or a mistaken belief of the strategic benefit which a business
combination with Warner might produce.
'394
This "threat" is far from real. The board of directors was responsi-
ble for adequately informing Time's shareholders about the merits of its
planned merger with Warner.395 Before Paramount announced its offer,
Time directors had mailed proxy solicitations requesting Time's share-
387. Id. at 93,283.
388. Id.
389. Id.
390. Time, No. 284, 1989, slip op. at 26. The court commented that:
While we affirm the result reached by the Chancellor, we think it unwise to
place undue emphasis upon long-term versus short-term corporate strategy. Two
key predicates underpin our analysis. First, Delaware law imposes on a board of
directors the duty to manage the business and affairs of the corporation. This broad
mandate includes a conferred authority to set a corporate course of action, including
time frame, designed to enhance corporate profitability. Thus, the question of "long-
term" versus "short-term" values is largely irrelevant because directors, generally,
are obliged to charter course for a corporation which is in its best interest without
regard to a fixed investment horizon.
Id. (citation and footnote omitted).
391. Id. at 35.
392. Id. at 36.
393. Id.
394. Id. (emphasis added).
395. The rules governing proxy solicitations require that "[n]o [proxy] statement shall con-
tain any statement which... is false or misleading with respect to any material fact, or which
omits to state any material fact necessary in order to make the statements therein not false or
misleading .. " 17 C.F.R. § 240.14c-6 (1989) (emphasis added). Presumably the benefits of
the proposed Time-Warner merger would have been considered a material fact, and therefore,
would have required disclosure in order to not mislead Time's shareholders.
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holders to vote for the Time-Warner merger.39 6 Under federal securities
laws, Time's directors had a duty to provide full and fair disclosure in
those proxy solicitations so that the shareholders could make an intelli-
gent decision.397 If the directors failed in this regard, and that failure
threatened Time's shareholders, there is no reason why those same direc-
tors should be permitted to eliminate the perceived "threat" by pursuing
the same course of action which caused the threat.
The other "legitimate concerns" recognized by the supreme court
are equally unconvincing. The court noted that "Time viewed the condi-
tions attached to Paramount's offer as introducing a degree of uncer-
tainty. . . .398 The court also accepted the assertion by Time's directors
that the "timing of Paramount's offer . . . [was] arguably designed to
upset, if not confuse, the Time stockholders' vote. ' 3 9 9 Despite the fact
that Time refused to discuss Paramount's negotiable offer with Para-
mount, the court concluded that the Time directors were "adequately
informed of the potential benefits of a transaction with Paramount."'
If Time's directors actually met with Paramount, these "threats"
could have been eliminated. A meeting could have resolved, or at least
concretely identified, the uncertainty surrounding Paramount's offer.
Time's directors could have become sufficiently informed and notified the
shareholders of any legitimate concern or uncertainty. The shareholders
then could have considered these issues in making their decision whether
to tender to Paramount or support the merger with Warner.
These trumped up threats to Time's "strategic plan" were found ad-
equate to satisy the first prong of Unocal."° This is the first time a court
has allowed a threat to a "strategic plan" to satisfy Unocal's first prong.
Directors' consideration of a strategic plan is not, however, an entirely
new concept.
Unocal allowed such consideration," 2 but under Unocal, this con-
sideration took place in the second prong of the analysis after a viable
396. Time, No. 284, 1989, slip op. at 18.
397. J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 337 U.S. 426, 431 (1964) (The purpose of the federal proxy
regulations "is to prevent management or others from obtaining authorization for corporate
action by means of deceptive or inadequate disclosure in proxy solicitation."). In Borak, the
Supreme Court quoted the legislative history of section 14(a), noting that " '[t]oo often proxies -
are solicited without explanation to the stockholder of the real nature of the questions for
which authority to cast his vote is sought.'" Id. (quotation omitted).
398. Time, No. 284, 1989, slip op. at 36.
399. Id. at 36-37.
400. Id. at 37.
401. Id.
402. Unocal, 493 A.2d at 955.
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threat to the corporation or its shareholders satisfied the first prong.40 3
Under Unocal, protection of directors' decisions by the business judg-
ment rule, required a viable threat to the corporation or its sharehold-
ers.' In Unocal, the directors had already established that Pickens'
two-tier offer posed a legitimate threat to the corporation and its share-
holders." 5 In Time, the threat recognized by the Delaware Supreme
Court was to the company's strategic plan and to the integrity of the
shareholders' decision-making process." 6
Allowing a threat to a strategic plan to satisfy Unocal's first prong
greatly expands director discretion to fight a proposed takeover. With-
out first requiring an identifiable threat to the company or its sharehold-
ers, any creative board can claim that its company's plan is threatened.
Limiting consideration of a long-term plan to Unocal's second prong
makes more sense. If a reasonably perceived coercive offer is outstand-
ing, directors' fiduciary duties require them to consider all possibili-
ties." 7 If, on the other hand, an outstanding offer is not coercive in an
identifiable respect, directors should evaluate whether its strategic plan
will ever maximize shareholder interests." 8
The likely impact of recognizing that a strategic plan can satisfy
Unocal's first prong is illustrated through further analysis of the Time
court's reasoning. In its decision, the Delaware Supreme Court consid-
ered Time's plan to become a world-wide media giant and its intention to
merge with Warner in furtherance of this plan." 9 The court then recog-
nized this plan as an interest worthy of protection by Time's directors.410
The court, did not, however, apply its reasoning consistently. The "stra-
tegic plan" that the Time court recognized involved a merger transaction
403. Id.
404. Id. See supra notes 75-115 and accompanying text for a discussion of how takeovers
may threaten a corporation or its shareholders.
405. Unocal, 493 A.2d at 956.
406. Time, No. 284, 1989, slip op. at 36-37.
407. Cf. Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 872 (Del. 1985) ("director's duty to inform
himself in preparation for a decision derives from the fiduciary capacity in which he serves the
corporation and its stockholders").
408. Easterbrook and Fischel assert that bidders propose takeovers because they think they
can make a profit in excess of the premium offered shareholders. Easterbrook & Fischel, supra
note 81, at 1174. Easterbrook and Fischel suggest that if management's plan is truly more
valuable than the bidder's offer, management should publicly disclose its plan. Id. at 1168.
The stock market will then reflect the new information and the future value of the company
under management's plan. Id. Assuming market efficiency, there will then be no room for a
bidder to pay a premium, take over the target company and make a profit. Id.
409. Time, No. 284, 1989, slip op. at 25-26.
410. Id. at 22.
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with Warner, and that plan was abandoned.41 The ultimate plan that
the court protected was Time's substituted plan to acquire Warner, and
this plan was created after announcement of Paramount's bid.412
By refusing to enjoin Time's defensive acquisition of Warner, the
Time court has invited companies to devise a plan and should an un-
wanted bidder seek control, just revise that plan to suit their needs.
4 13
As long as a strategic goal exists, directors may revise the company's
plan and need not consider the desires of its shareholders414 or the effect
on the company.415 Time suggests that as long as a revised plan does not
arise from an "egregious" abuse of discretion, a court will uphold direc-
tor action and protect it under the btisiness judgment rule.4 16 In future
411. Id. at 22-23.
412. Id. at 23. The supreme court affirmed the chancery court's finding that "the initial
Time-Warner transaction [was] negotiated at arms length and the restructured Time-Warner
transaction... resulted from Paramount's offer and its expected effect on a Time shareholder
vote." Id.
413. In Time, the Delaware Chancery Court acknowledged that that the revised acquisition
transaction was "reactive" in important aspects, but focused on the its finding that the revised
transaction had its "origin and central purpose in bona fide strategic business planning."
Time, [1989 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 94,514, at 93,283. The Delaware
Supreme Court also emphasized the value of strategic planning and did not seem concerned
that the fundamental structure of the deal changed. The court noted that "Time representa-
tives lauded the lack of debt [under the initially-planned transaction] to the United States
Senate and to the President of the United States." Time, No. 284, 1989, slip op. at 17. The
court also acknowledged that the revised transaction caused Time to incur seven to ten billion
dollars worth of debt, "thus eliminating one of the principal transaction-related benefits of the
original merger agreement." Id. at 22. The court disregarded the significant differences in the
two Time-Warner transactions, and instead focused on the broader company "strategy." Id.
at 40. The supreme court affirmed the chancery court's conclusion that the revised deal with
Warner "had as its goal the carrying forward of a pre-existing transaction in an altered form."
Id. The broad discretion entrusted to Time directors to revise their transaction in order to
further a pre-existing corporate strategy indicates that a broadly-conceived "corporate strat-
egy" may permit directors wide discretion in defending against any potential "threat" to that
strategy.
414. Id. at 41. The supreme court noted that "although Time was required, as a result of
Paramount's hostile offer, to incur a heavy debt to finance its acquisition of Warner, that fact
alone does not render the board's decision unreasonable so long as the directors could reason-
ably perceive the debt load not to be so injurious to the corporation as to jeopardize its well-
being." Id. The court may have appeared to have imposed some limitation to director discre-
tion; however, based on its approval of Time's acquisition of Warner despite the adverse effects
suffered by Time, that limitation is probably artificial.
The chancery court, in its opinion, also reinforced broad director discretion despite the
effect on the company or the desires of the shareholders. See Time, [1989 Transfer Binder]
Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCII) 94,514, at 93,266. The chancery court noted that even though a
majority of shareholders may disagree with the wisdom of a board decision, directors have no
obligation "to take another, more popular course of action." Id.
415. See supra notes 343-81 and accompanying text for a discussion of the effects of the
revised Time-Warner agreement on Time.
416. Time, [1989 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 94,514, at 93,284 ("[T]here is
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cases, courts may have to consider whether all strategic plans will consti-
tute a legally cognizable interest, protectable under Unocal, and if so, to
what extent directors can evade shareholder desires under the guise of
furthering that plan.417
D. Unavoidable Conflicts of Interest
Besides the practical difficulties in applying Revlon, Inc. v. MacAn-
drews & Forbes Holdingsa"' and Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co.,"'
business judgment rule protection of corporate control decisions is theo-
retically troublesome. Corporate control decisions are unlike other deci-
sions protected by the business judgment rule.420 Control contests
inevitably place directors in a dilemma.421 The conflict facing directors
arises in part from their professional and social relationships with com-
pany officers.422 Shareholders formally cast votes for directors; but gen-
erally, executive management writes the ballot.423 Directors and
company officers function jointly as a management team, and depend on
each other for effective decision making.424 This makes it difficult for
directors to objectively evaluate a proposed takeover bid designed to dis-
place current management and themselves.42 Besides losing the per-
no persuasive evidence that the board of Time ha[d] a corrupt or venal motivation.., even in
the face of the cost that that course will no doubt entail for the company's shareholders in the
short run.").
417. See supra notes 386-417 and accompanying text for additional non-shareholder inter-
ests affected by Time's long-term plan.
418. 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1986).
419. 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985).
420. Minstar Acquiring Corp. v. AMF Inc., 621 F. Supp. 1252, 1259 (S.D.N.Y. 1985). But
see Pogostin v. Rice, 480 A.2d 619, 627 (Del. 1984) (business judgment rule equally applicable
"in the context of a takeover").
421. Unocal, 493 A.2d at 955 (in this situation, "'directors are of necessity confronted with
a conflict of interest' ") (quoting Bennett v. Propp, 187 A.2d 405, 409 (Del. 1962)).
422. Although typically, directors are more likely to side with management than with a
hostile bidder, this is not always the case. See In re RJR Nabisco Shareholders Litig., [1988-
1989 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCHI) 94,194 (Del. Ch. Jan. 31), appeal denied
mem., 556 A.2d 1070 (Del. 1989). In RJR, the plaintiffs accused the target directors of being
biased against management. Id. at 91,702-03. The plaintiffs in this case alleged the target
directors were motivated by a desire to disassociate themselves from the management plan
because of the "harsh [public] criticism [management's LBO proposal] engendered." Id. at
91,702. For example, Time magazine trumpeted the management proposal as "A Game of
Greed." Id. at 91,711 n.14. The court, however, rejected this assertion, and found that the
directors acted reasonably and were protected under the business judgment rule. Id. at 91,703.
423. W. KNEPPER & D. BAILEY, supra note 7, at 4.
424. Id. at 2 ("[D]irectors [have] limited time to devote to their directorial duties and [are]
dependent upon management for access to administration, [therefore, they are able to] do little
to guide or direct corporate policies in many instances.").
425. Herzel, Schmidt & Davis, supra note 90, at 113 (Management's desire to retain control
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sonal satisfaction derived from serving a public corporation, a change in
control may cause directors to lose the prestige, power and compensation
accompanying directorships.426
Courts recognize that a conflict may impair a director's indepen-
dence;427 however, courts are reluctant to disallow business judgment
rule protection absent a direct financial interest.428 Instead, courts rely
on the independence of "special committees"429 and outside directors to
show that boards, at least seek objectivity.43° In reality, though, as long
as management selects directors, the title "independent director" remains
an oxymoron, and management and shareholder interests may never be
completely reconciled.431
is due in part to "a belief (usually held in good faith and often quite justifiable) in the high
quality of [its] own management of the company."). See also Dynamics Corp. of Am. v. CTS
Corp., 794 F.2d 250, 254 (7th Cir. 1986) ("It is only human for [the target] officers and direc-
tors to doubt that [a successful bidder displacing current management will] ... actually do a
better job of running [the] company."), rev'd on other grounds, 481 U.S. 69 (1987).
426. See generally Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 81, at 1194-1204; Greene, supra note
44, at 730; but see Manning, The Business Judgment Rule: An Overview, 45 OHIo ST. L.J. 615,
618 (1984).
427. See, e.g., Grobow v. Perot, 539 A.2d 180, 188 (Del. 1988) (plaintiffs must demonstrate
"either a financial interest or entrenchment on the part of the [target] directors").
428. See, e.g., RJR Nabisco, [1988-1989 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 194,194,
at 91,710 (court dismissed plaintiffs' allegations that special committee was motivated by fear
of personal liability, noting that "[t]he sort of 'interest' that qualifies to disarm a board... is a
financial interest in the transaction adverse to that of the corporation or its shareholders.").
429. A "special committee" is an ad hoe committee created in situations where a board as a
whole is not completely objective. Simpson, supra note 140, at 666.
430. Id. at 673-74. See also Grobow, 539 A.2d at 190 ("[A]pproval of a transaction by a
majority of independent, disinterested directors almost always bolsters a presumption that the
business judgment rule attaches to transactions approved by a board of directors."); Unocal,
493 A.2d at 955 (showing of good faith "is materially enhanced... by the approval of a board
comprised of a majority of outside independent directors"); West Point-Pepperell, Inc. v. J.P.
Stevens & Co., 542 A.2d 770, 779-80 (Del. Ch. 1988) (although facts indicated likelihood that
special committee may have favored management's preferred bidder, court upheld special
committee's decision because there was no direct evidence of bad faith). But see Dynamics
Corp. of Am. v. CTS Corp., 794 F.2d 250, 256 (7th Cir. 1986) (in "takeover situations, direc-
tors have a clear conflict of interest, and it is not cured by vesting the power of decision in a
board of directors in which insiders are a minority .... No one likes to be fired, whether he is
just a director or also an officer."), rev'd on other grounds, 481 U.S. 69 (1987); Robert M. Bass
Group, Inc. v. Evans, 552 A.2d 1227, 1243 (Del. Ch. 1988) (special committee not free to
"cram down" management restructuring "in order to 'protect' their shareholders from a non-
coercive, economically superior one").
431. Coffee, Market Failure and the Economic Case for a Mandatory Disclosure System, 70
VA. L. REV. 717, 724 (1984) (interests of management and shareholders can never be perfectly
aligned). See also RJR Nabisco, [1988-1989 Transfer Binder] Fed. See. L. Rep. (CCH) %
94,194, at 91,701-02 (upholding special committee's selection of outside bid over equivalent bid
by RJR Nabisco's management despite "imaginative" argument that special committee acted
in its self-interest by publicly repudiating RJR management's competing, but self-entrenching,
bid).
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 23:919
Even absent a conflict of interest, directors may act contrary to the
shareholders' best interests. Bidders profit by utilizing a target's assets
more efficiently,4 32 and, therefore, are attracted to inefficient compa-
nies.A Inefficient management that is arguably not working to maxi-
mize company wealth prior to a takeover threat is not in a position to
decide whether a tender offer serves the shareholders' best interests.434
Besides this, shareholders have a "right" to management which will max-
imize the value of their shares.4 35 Although directors enjoy broad pow-
ers to fight a threatening takeover, 36 "shareholders are the real targets
of a takeover bid, [and] they[, therefore,] should dictate the nature and
degree of management's response." '437 In control contests, the bidder
asks shareholders to make a decision.438 Yet this decision can be effec-
tively thwarted by a management team opposing the bid.439 One federal
court recognized this problem, noting that "a board of director's asser-
tion of a unilateral right.., to act as a surrogate for shareholders' in-
432. Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 81, at 1178.
433. Id. This presumption, however, is highly debated. For views contrary to Easterbrook
and Fischel's, see Herman & Lowenstein, The Efficiency Effects of Hostile Takeovers, in
KNIGHTS, RAIDERS, AND TARGETS 211, 227 (1988) (recent studies show target companies are
well-managed, financially healthy companies); A. Fleischer, Jr., Responses to Takeover Bids:
Corporate, SEC, Tactical, and Fiduciary Considerations (BNA) No. 6-2nd, at A-1 (1985) (cit-
ing Merrill Lynch study concluding that target companies generally experienced above average
earning growth and cash flow).
434. Cohn, Tender Offers and the Sale of Control: An Analogue to Determine the Validity of
Target Management Defensive Measures, 66 IowA L. Rnv. 475, 508 (1981). It is "ironic" for
current management to pose as shareholder protector when the undervalued market price of
the target's stock reflects the "market's collective judgment of the inefficiency of current man-
agement." Id.
435. Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 81, at 1191. Butsee Moran v. Household Int'l, Inc.,
490 A.2d 1059, 1070 (Del. Ch.) ("[S]hareholders do not possess a contractual right to receive
takeover bids. The shareholders' ability to gain premiums through takeover activity is subject
to the good faith business judgment of the board of directors .... "), aff'd, 500 A.2d 1346 (Del.
1985).
436. Unocal, 493 A.2d at 954 ("board's power to act derives from its fundamental duty and
obligation to protect the corporate enterprise ... from harm"). See supra notes 75-115 and
accompanying text for a discussion of how takeovers threaten the corporate enterprise.
437. Andre, Tender Offers for Corporate Control. A Critical Analysis and Proposals for Re-
form, 12 DEL. J. CORP. L. 865, 902 (1987). See also Grand Metro. PLC v. Pillsbury Co., 558
A.2d 1049, 1060 n.10 (Del. Ch. 1988) (quoting Conoco Inc. v. Seagram Co., 517 F. Supp. 1299
(S.D.N.Y. 1981)).
What is sometimes lost sight of in these tender offer controversies is that the share-
holders, not the directors, have the right to franchise with respect to the shares
owned by them; "stockholders, once informed of the facts, have a right to make their
own decisions in matters pertaining to their economic self-interest."
Conoco Inc. v. Seagram Co., 517 F. Supp. 1299, 1303 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (citation omitted).
438. A. FLEISCHER, supra note 76, at 343.
439. Id.
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dependent right of alienation of stock is troublesome."'
IV. THE PROPRIETY OF BUSINESS JUDGMENT RULE PROTECTION IN
CORPORATE CONTROL CONTEXTS
Courts are unable to define and consistently apply standards of di-
rector responsibilities in control contexts." The standards for determin-
ing when and how Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings"2 and
Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co. " interact to judge applicability of
the business judgment rule continue to be malleable and unpredict-
able.444 The ease with which courts apply the business judgment rule
fails to fully recognize that corporate control decisions are different from
other decisions for which the business judgment rule was devised." 5 The
business judgment rule as presently applied ignores the real and unavoid-
able conflicts of interest that arise in all.corporate control decisions,44 6
and the rights of shareholders as owners of the corporation." 7 As a re-
sult, application of the business judgment rule precludes judicial scrutiny
of board decisions, even those which may result in harm to shareholders
or to the corporation." 8  To remedy business judgment rule problems,
the business judgment rule could either be modified or abandoned, or the
440. Minstar, 621 F. Supp. at 1260 n.6; see also Cohn, supra note 434, at 501.
441. See supra notes 262-417 and accompanying text.
442. 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1986).
443. 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985).
444. See supra notes 262-417 and accompanying text.
445. Minstar Acquiring Corp. v. AMF Inc., 621 F. Supp. 1252, 1259 (S.D.N.Y. 1985)
("The [business judgment] rule was developed to protect directors' judgments on questions of
corporate governance.... Defensive tactics, however, raise a wholly different set of considera-
tions. The problem is that defensive tactics often, by their very nature, act as a restraint on
business purposes."). See also Panter v. Marshall Fields & Co., 646 F.2d 271, 299-300 (7th
Cir.) (Cudahy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (distinguishing between corporate
activities in managing business enterprise where judicial interference would be undesirable,
from those activities involving capital investment and distribution, which involve corporation-
shareholder relationship, and therefore justify judicial intervention to ensure equitable behav-
ior), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1092 (1981).
446. See supra notes 418-40 and accompanying text. Some commentators note that a con-
flict of interest alone is not enough to preclude application of the business judgment rule be-
cause a conflict is present in many decisions properly delegated to boards. See, e.g.,
Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 81, at 1198 n.106.
447. Norlin Corp. v. Rooney, Pace Inc., 744 F.2d 255, 258 (2d Cir. 1984) (court's role "is to
protect fundamental structure of corporate governance[; w]hile the day-to-day affairs of a com-
pany are to be managed by its officers under the supervision of directors, decisions affecting a
corporation's ultimate destiny are for the shareholders to make in accordance with democratic
procedures.").
448. See supra notes 349-81 and accompanying text for a discussion of the harmful effects of
the Time decision.
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decision-making process could be given to shareholders, rather than the
directors.
A. Abandoning Business Judgment Protection in Control Contexts
Wholesale abandonment of the business judgment rule in corporate
control contexts is not the answer. 49 Without business judgment rule
protection, directors would be held to an ordinary negligence stan-
dard.a50 Directorial decisions would be compared with what an "ordina-
rily careful and prudent director" under similar circumstances would
have decided.4 ' This proposal, though initially appealing, is not without
problems.
The business judgment rule exists to encourage directorial service
and to enhance the integrity of corporate governance.452 Without pro-
tection of the business judgment rule, the potential for personal liability
would likely deter knowledgeable businesspeople from serving as direc-
tors, 53 despite statutes enacted in virtually all states allowing corpora-
tions to provide insurance against directors' negligence454  and to
indemnify directors against personal liability.4 5 Even if statutes allow
for insurance or indemnity, directors may consider whether adequate fi-
nancial protection is afforded. Director and officer liability insurance has
449. See Manning, supra note 426, at 619-21. But see Note, False Halo: The Business Judg-
ment Rule in Corporate Control Contests, 66 TEX. L. REv. 843 (1988) (proposing abolition of
the business judgment rule in hostile takeover cases).
450. W. KNEPPER & D. BAILEY, supra note 7, at 43-44.
451. Id. at 43.
452. See Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 872 (Del. 1985).
453. Pease, Outside Directors. Their Importance to the Corporation and Protection from Lia-
bility, 1987 DEL. J. CORP. L. 25, 28. See also W. KNEPPER & D. BAILEY, supra note 7, at 183.
See also supra notes 39-54 and accompanying text for a general discussion of the business
judgment rule rationale.
454. W. KNEPPER & D. BAILEY, supra note 7, at 688 ("[C]orporations are expressly au-
thorized to purchase and maintain [directors and officers] insurance by statutes of all states
except Vermont.").
455. Id. at 654 (indemnification has been legislated in all 50 states); see, e.g., DEL. CODE
ANN. tit. 8, § 145 (1983), which provides in pertinent part:
(a) A corporation may indemnify any person who was or is a party or is threatened
to be made a party to any threatened, pending or completed action .. . by reason of
the fact that he is or was a director ... if he acted in good faith and in a manner he
reasonably believed to be in or not opposed to the best interests of the corporation
(g) A corporation shall have power to purchase and maintain insurance on behalf of
any person who is or was a director.., against any liability asserted against him and
incurred by him in any such capacity, or arising out of his status as such, whether or
not the corporation would have the power to indemnify him against such liability
under this section.
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become prohibitively expensive in recent years and, therefore, is often not
practicably available.4" 6 Even if insurance is available, many insurance
companies exclude takeover fights from policy coverage. 57 Such exclu-
sions exist regardless of whether a takeover attempt is "alleged or actual,
successful or unsuccessful.,
458
Insurance and indemnity statutes may or may not offer financial
protection to directors, but many directors serve for the prestige, power
and camaraderie accompanying their positions, as well as for monetary
compensation. Directors fearful of losing their jobs or suffering personal
embarrassment may be unwilling to risk exposure to public judgment
despite protection from financial liability.
B. Giving Shareholders the Right to Vote
Inadequacies in current law governing responsibilities of boards of
directors faced with takeover threats have been identified.459 The busi-
ness judgment rule serves to protect board decisions; yet, where corpo-
rate control is involved, concerns with the potential for conflicts of
interest and abrogation of shareholder rights outweigh the policy ration-
ale underlying the business judgment rule. In part due to the complexity
of control contests, and in part due to courts' decision to defer to boards
of directors, courts do not consistently apply standards of review for
evaluating board decisions in control contexts.460 Even if courts were
willing and able to consistently apply a heightened standard of review
appropriate to scrutinize corporate control decisions in which conflicts of
interest are unavoidable, the potential for personal financial liability and
professional embarrassment would deter otherwise qualified business-
people from serving as directors.461
Giving the ultimate decision-making authority for such decisions to
shareholders avoids problems arising under current law from director
conflicts of interest and avoids director liability problems which would
arise if a higher level of judicial scrutiny was required. In addition,
shareholder vote in control situations does not usurp director power to
manage the corporation.462 Corporate control decisions involve who will
run the company, not how it is run. Directors will retain full discretion
456. W. KNEPPER & D. BAILEY, supra note 7, at 685.
457. Id. at 724.
458. Id.
459. See supra notes 249-440 and accompanying text.
460. See supra notes 262-417 and accompanying text.
461. See supra notes 418-40 and accompanying text.
462. In fact, the shareholders' "right to elect and alter management [is] perhaps the last and
most fundamental vestiges of shareholder authority." Cohn, supra note 434, at 501.
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to manage the company's business and affairs as long as they are the
desired leaders.
Those opposed to giving shareholders the right to vote argue that
directors have a duty to protect non-shareholder interests, which would
not be adequately protected by voting shareholders.46 Opponents might
also argue that directors, rather than courts or shareholders, are best
suited to make a unified and informed decision because of their special
knowledge of the company and the business environment. 4 4
Under current fiduciary concepts, when faced with a situation ad-
verse to shareholders' interests, such as a coercive takeover threat, direc-
tors have the right, and even the duty, to oppose it.465 This principle is
implicit in directors' fiduciary duties to shareholders.466 Directors also
have fiduciary duties to the corporations that they serve.467 Some courts,
therefore, hold that directors should consider the impact a takeover may
have on a corporation's non-shareholder interests including employees,
creditors and the local community. 68
Legal scholars widely debate whether and to what extent non-share-
holder interests can eclipse those of the shareholders, but courts gener-
ally agree that directors may not completely and permanently foreclose
shareholder choice.469 At one extreme, Professors Easterbrook (now
463. Id. at 506. Cohn commented that directors possess
greater ability and objectivity to consider the long-range concerns raised by a tender
offer, including the interests of employees, suppliers, and other groups that may be
materially affected. Shareholders, on the other hand, are seen as having a narrower
interest . . . [and may] disregard long-term consequences to the corporation, non-
tendering shareholders, and other interests.
Id.
464. Paramount Communications, Inc. v. Time Inc., [1989 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L.
Rep. (CCH) % 94,514, at 93,277 (Del. Ch. July 14, 1989), aff'd, No. 284, 1989 (Del. Feb. 26,
1990). See also Herzel, Schmidt & Davis, supra note 90, at 111.
465. Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 954 (1985) ("[IThe board's power
to act derives from its fundamental duty and obligation to protect the corporate enterprise...
from harm.").
466. Lipton I, supra note 89, at 35 ("It would seem beyond question that [directors] must
govern on behalf of shareholders by whom they are elected and to whom the fiduciary duties of
care and loyalty are said to run.").
467. Guth v. Loft, 5 A.2d 503, 510 (Del. 1939).
468. See, e.g., GAF Corp. v. Union Carbide Corp., 624 F. Supp. 1016, 1019-20 (S.D.N.Y.
1985) ("A corporation with a perceived threat of dismemberment of large divisions of the
enterprise, employing thousands of employees, owes [those employees] substantial regard
. ...."). Some states have provided by statute for such considerations. See, e.g., MINN. STAT.
ANN. § 302A.251(5) (West Supp. 1990); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 351.347(4) (Vernon Supp. 1990).
See also supra note 112. The rationale for allowing non-shareholder considerations is based in
part, on social responsibility concerns, and in part on a belief that non-shareholder constituen-
cies "share the risk and are vital to the success of corporate activity." Lipton I, supra note 89,
at 37.
469. See, e.g., Dynamics Corp. of Am. v. CTS Corp., 794 F.2d 250, 259 (7th Cir. 1986)
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Judge Easterbrook of the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit) and
Fischel urge complete managerial passivity.4 70 Under this theory, mar-
ket forces, without director interference, will ensure the highest and best
use of economic assets,471 and this use will benefit society as a whole.4 72
At the other extreme, Professor Lipton argues that directors have a re-
sponsibility to consider the effect a takeover may have on non-share-
holder interests.473 The non-shareholder interests theory recognizes that
corporations have a social responsibility to serve community interests as
well as shareholder interests.474
In the middle of the these two extremes, Professor Coffee reasons
that some non-shareholder constituencies can protect themselves.475 For
example, banks and other substantial creditors can protect themselves
through restrictive debt covenants; upper management can negotiate
stock options or employment contracts; and, lower level employees can
bargain collectively through a union.476 Coffee recognizes, however, that
smaller creditors and lower level management employees may not be able
to adequately protect themselves.477 Coffee agrees that management
owes its primary fiduciary duties to shareholders, but should also be con-
cerned with corporate social responsibility.478 Coffee challenges direc-
tors to "ask what strategies for increasing shareholder wealth at the
expense of [non-shareholder constituencies] it wishes to encourage." 479
As a solution, Coffee urges a "policy of encouraging greater employee
(poison-pill plan allegedly to prevent "bust up" takeover held invalid because it "effectively
preclude[d] a hostile takeover, and thus allow[ed] management to take the shareholders hos-
tage"), rev'd on other grounds, 481 U.S. 69 (1987); Grand Metro. PLC v. Pillsbury Co., 558
A.2d 1049, 1060 (Del. Ch. 1988); City Capital Assocs. Ltd. Partnership v. Interco Inc., 551
A.2d 787, 799-800 (Del. Ch.), appeal dismissed, 556 A.2d 1070 (Del. 1988). But see Time,
[1989 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 94,514, at 93,284 (Time's defensive merger
with Warner did not "legally preclude the successful prosecution of a hostile tender offer...
[although it may have] practically impact[ed] the likelihood of a successful takeover offer.")
(emphasis added).
470. Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 81, at 1164.
471. Id. at 1169 ("[t]ender bidding process polices managers... and disciplines or replaces
them if they stray too far from the services of the shareholders").
472. Id. at 1190 ("Takeovers improve efficiency, and that improvement usually enhances
the position of those who deal with the firm."). See also Fischel, The Corporate Governance
Movement, 35 VAND. L. REV. 1259, 1269 (1982).
473. Lipton II, supra note 110, at 105-06.
474. Note, Stakeholder Versus Stockholders: The Director's Proper Constituency in a Con-
test for Corporate Control, 15 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 475, 488 n.109 (1989).
475. Coffee, Regulating the Market for Corporate Control: A Critical Assessment of the
Tender Offer's Role in Corporate Governance, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 1146, 1247-48 (1984).
476. Id. at 1247.
477. Id. at 1248.
478. Id. at 1248-49.
479. Id. at 1248.
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ownership in the corporation. ' 48 0 Greater employee stock ownership,
presumably, will bridge the gap between management and control and
encourage long-term profit maximization.481
Non-shareholder interests involve important social policy concerns
that corporations cannot responsibly ignore, but these interests should
not become paramount to shareholder interests.482 In Revlon, Inc. v.
MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings,483 the Delaware Supreme Court noted
that "while concern for various corporate constituencies is proper when
addressing a takeover threat, that principle is limited by the requirement
that there be some rationally related benefit accruing to the stockhold-
ers." 484 Therefore, allowing directors to justify their corporate control
decisions based on non-shareholder interests may be undesirable because
the business judgment rule precludes any real inquiry into directors'
motivations.
In Time, both the Supreme and the Chancery Courts of Delaware
accepted Time's claim that its distinctive corporate culture was a protect-
able non-shareholder interest.485 The supreme court did not specifically
address the limitations of non-shareholder considerations, however, the
chancery court warned that preserving corporate culture may not always
suffice as a legally protectable interest under Unocal,4 86 "recogniz[ing]
the risk of cheap deception that would be entailed in a broad and indis-
criminate recognition of 'corporate culture.' ",487 In deciding that Time's
plan was not a "cheap deception," the chancery court explored the po-
tential effect Paramount's proposed takeover of Time might have on non-
shareholder interests, including Time magazine employees and society as
a whole.488 At Time, the senior writers report directly to a special com-
mittee of Time's board.4 89 Time argued that this management structure
helps preserve its editorial independence.490
480. Id. at 1251.
481. Id.
482. Cf Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, 506 A.2d 173, 183 (Del. 1986).
The court stated that a board may consider non-shareholder constituencies only if those con-
siderations "are rationally related to benefits accruing to the stockholders... [and may not be
considered at all] when an auction among active bidders is in progress .... ." Id.
483. 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1986).
484. Id. at 176.
485. Time, [1989 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 94,514, at 93,283. See also,
Paramount Communications, Inc. v. Time Inc., No. 284, 1989, slip op. at 35-36 (Del. Feb. 26,
1990).
486. Time, [1989 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 94,514, at 93,267.
487. Id.
488. Id. at 93,269.
489. Id.
490. Id. at 93,268.
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The chancery court also accepted Time's concern with the effect a
Paramount takeover might have had on society as a whole.49 One of
Time's directors testified that Time's editorial freedom was "absolutely
essential if members of our society are to be enlightened enough to form
wise judgments and fulfill their responsibilities as citizens."49 The court
accepted the validity of these concerns without any indication that Para-
mount intended to interfere with Time's editorial independence.493 The
chancery court did not dispute the importance of Time's management
structure.494
Both the supreme and the chancery courts in Time appear willing to
defer corporate control decisions to directors whether the threat per-
ceived by the directors is a concrete threat to the company's shareholders
or an ambiguous threat to the company's "culture." Neither court ar-
ticulated what is needed for directors to substantiate a protectable inter-
est in the company's culture. The chancery court acclaimed Time's
stated concern for its employees and society as a whole.495 However, if
all a company has to do is express a concern for employees, it would not
be difficult for a company to write a strategic plan articulating any
number of concerns, and thereby avoid judicial scrutiny. For example,
an airline company has a non-shareholder interest in public safety; a hos-
pital company has a non-shareholder interest in its patients and in the
health of society at large; and, a restaurant has a non-shareholder interest
in the quality of the food served to its customers. Each of these non-
shareholder interests is clearly an important social interest, but assigning
to directors the responsibility of furthering these interests in a takeover
context is troublesome for at least two reasons.
First, directors are protected by the business judgment rule because
they are experts in business.4 96 "Expanding corporate governance to en-
compass society as a whole benefits neither corporations nor society. '497
The legislature provides a better forum than corporate boardrooms for
491. Id. at 93,269.
492. Id. (testimony of Director Matina S. Homer, then president of Radcliffe College and
Time director since 1975).
493. In fact, Paramount tried to negotiate a deal with Time, and may have been willing to
commit to preserving Time's editorial independence, but Time refused to even talk with Para-
mount. Id. at 93,271.
494. Id. This is true despite the fact that Time magazine contributes 20% of Time-
Warer's revenues. Id.
495. Id. at 93,269.
496. Solash v. Telex Corp., [1987-1988 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCII) 93,608,
at 97,727 (Del. Ch. Jan. 19, 1988).
497. Lipton I, supra note 89, at 42.
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considering broad social and political issues.498 Directors, therefore,
should manage "on behalf of shareholders by whom they are elected and
to whom the fiduciary duties of care and loyalty are said to run."4 99
Second, although social policy concerns may be an important part of
corporate governance, these considerations are not appropriate in take-
over situations."° The business judgment rule gives directors broad dis-
cretion and limits judicial scrutiny. Expanding the list of interests
directors can consider opens the door to self-entrenchment decisions ra-
tionalized with insincere articulations of non-shareholder concerns. 50'
Therefore, a shareholder vote is a more appropriate mechanism for mak-
ing corporate control decisions.
In addition to concerns with non-shareholder interests, opponents of
a shareholder vote may argue that the administrative difficulties in coor-
dinating an informed shareholder vote outweigh the benefits gained." 2
Opponents may also argue that a coercive tender offer may unfairly force
inadequately informed shareholders into making a decision.10 3 These ar-
guments are not persuasive for two reasons. First, shareholders can and
do make unified decisions. In proxy elections, shareholders have both
the right and the ability to oust current management.5 Under current
proxy rules, Congress has given shareholders of reporting companies' °s
the right to determine company control.506 The SEC, under Congres-
sional authority, has provided strict regulations governing proxy solicita-
tions.50 7 These regulations are designed to ensure full and fair disclosure
to shareholders which enhances shareholder ability to vote in their best
interests.50 Besides their disclosure orientation, proxy rules also protect
498. Id. at 43.
499. Id. at 35. Lipton recognizes that unhappy shareholders can sell out, but those who
choose to invest for the long-term deserve directors' attention. Id. at 35-36.
500. Cf. Revlon, 506 A.2d at 182.
501. See supra notes 418-40 and accompanying text for a discussion of conflicts of interest
which may taint director decisions.
502. Booth, Is There Any Valid Reason Why Target Managers Oppose Tender Offers?, 14
SEc. REG. L.J. 43, 56-57 (1986).
503. See supra notes 86-98 and accompanying text for a discussion of the coercive nature of
two-tier bids.
504. Lipton II, supra note 110, at 116.
505. Reporting companies are companies which are required to register their stock under
section 12 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. 15 U.S.C. § 78(1) (Supp. 1989). In general,
reporting companies include all corporations with securities that are registered on a national
exchange, or with assets in excess of $5 million and a class of equity securities held by 500 or
more persons. Id.
506. Id. § 78(n); 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a (1989).
507. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a (1989).
508. Schultz, The Boards of Directors: Composition, Duties and Liabilities, Meetings and
Procedures (BNA) No. 3-2nd, at A-2 to 3 (Apr. 26, 1983).
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shareholders from fraud and promote the free exercise of voting rights by
shareholders5 0 9
Second, as long as shareholders are adequately informed, the risk of
coercion by a hostile bidder is mitigated. 10 An informed shareholder
vote will require additional time and money, but such costs would not be
excessive when compared with the benefits to be gained.5" In particular,
additional time would be useful in allowing shareholders an opportunity
to disseminate relevant information in order to cast an educated and un-
coerced vote.
V. A PROPOSED LEGISLATIVE SOLUTION
Absent the opportunity for shareholders to vote in control decisions,
the business judgment rule as applied to corporate takeovers may not
adequately protect shareholders from director's conflicts.5 2 Yet aban-
donment of the rule would create new problems.5"3 This author, there-
fore, proposes a legislative solution which will transfer the ultimate
decision-making authority to corporate shareholders. The proposal is
designed to protect shareholders from self-serving management and to
ensure availability of all significant information so that shareholders can
make a knowledgeable decision. This section discusses competing federal
and state interests in implementing takeover legislation and proposes a
federal statute to be amended to existing federal takeover law.
A. Federal and State Interests in Takeover Legislation
A publicly traded corporation is governed by both federal" 4 and
509. Perelman v. Pennsylvania Real Estate Inv. Trust, 432 F. Supp. 1298, 1300 (E.D. Pa.
1977). See also J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 431 (1964) (remedial purpose of proxy
rules stems from Congress' belief that "fair corporate suffrage is important shareholder right")
(citation omitted); Klaus v. Hi-Shear Corp., 528 F.2d 225, 232 (9th Cir. 1975) ("Congress
intended to guarantee the integrity of the processes of corporate democracy.").
510. See Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 890 (Del. 1985) (board "required to disclose
'all germane facts' which a reasonable shareholder would have considered important in decid-
ing whether to approve the merger").
511. See H.R. REP. No. 181, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 1, 2 ("Informed shareholders are critical
to the effective functioning of U.S. corporations and to confidence in the capital markets as a
whole. When an investor purchases common stock in a corporation, that individual also ob-
tains the ability to participate in making certain major decisions affecting that corporation.").
512. See supra notes 418-40 and accompanying text.
513. See supra notes 450-58 and accompanying text.
514. Federal regulation, including legislation with regard to tax, antitrust, price discrimina-
tion, and unfair or deceptive acts, controls all United States business enterprises. H. HENN &
J. ALEXANDER, supra note 7, at 36-41. In addition the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securi-
ties Exchange Act of 1934 govern all listed securities and their issuers. Id. at 796-813.
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state law. 5  The Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution,516
authorizes Congress to enact federal legislation regulating corporations
because corporate activity affects interstate commerce.5 17 States also
possess power to govern activities of corporations incorporated within its
borders, and in fact, provide most corporate legislation. 18 State regula-
tion, however, is constrained by the Commerce 51 9 and Supremacy
5 20
Clauses of the United States Constitution.
A state maintains an interest in ensuring the integrity of the corpo-
rate governance system it has enacted and in "promoting stable relation-
ships among parties involved in the corporations it charters."5'' In
addition, states are concerned that the takeover of a local company might
result in harm to residents5 22 and to the state itself.523 States fear that a
takeover may result in the firing of resident employees or the moving of
corporate headquarters and significant business operations to another
state. 24 As a result, states are not necessarily motivated to protect
shareholders, and may be more concerned with non-shareholder interestg
than with shareholder interests. State legislation to date has been ineffec-
tive in ensuring shareholder protection and, often, has been invalidated
as violative of the Commerce or Supremacy Clauses.
5 25
515. State law governs the formation and general activities of a corporation incorporated
within that state. Id. at 176-85.
516. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. "The Congress shall have Power ... To regulate Com-
merce among the several States .... " Id.
517. Id. See also A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935)
(holding that commerce power authorizes Congress to regulate all activities which utilize
means of interstate commerce or effect interstate commerce).
518. H. HENN & J. ALEXANDER, supra note 7, at 176-85 (list of incorporation considera-
tions which indicates extent of state control over company operation).
519. The Commerce Clause acts both as a grant of federal power and a limit of state power.
Kassel v. Consolidated Freightways Corp., 450 U.S. 662, 669 (1981) (Powell, J., plurality
opinion).
520. U.S. CONST. art VI. cl. 2. "The laws of the United States... shall be the Supreme
Law of the Land." Id.
521. CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of Am., 481 U.S. 69, 91 (1987).
522. See, eg., GAF Corp. v. Union Carbide Corp., 624 F. Supp. 1016, 1019-20 (S.D.N.Y.
1985).
523. Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624, 646 n.* (1982) (Powell, J., concurring in part);
BNS Inc. v. Koppers Co., 683 F. Supp. 458, 473 (D. Del. 1988).
524. MITE, 457 U.S. at 646 n.* (Powell, J., concurring in part) ("When corporate head-
quarters (or significant operating facilities) are transferred out of a city and [s]tate into [an-
other], the [s]tate and locality from which the transfer is made inevitably suffer significantly.").
525. See, eg., MITE, 457 U.S. at 646 (striking down Illinois statute which required ap-
proval by local enforcement body because ofits undue burden on interstate commerce); Tyson
Foods, Inc. v. McReynolds, 865 F.2d 99, 101 (6th Cir. 1989) (Tennessee act violated Com-
merce Clause to extent that it applied to target companies incorporated outside Tennessee);
Campeau Corp. v. Federated Dep't Stores, 679 F. Supp. 735, 739 (S.D. Ohio 1988) (Ohio act
which affected corporations incorporated outside Ohio with substantial interests in Ohio vio-
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Federal takeover legislation, on the other hand, specifically ad-
dresses shareholder interests and protects shareholders from fraud by re-
quiring full and fair disclosure. 26 In regulating takeovers, Congress
seeks to favor neither target management nor bidder. 27 Congress has
recognized that tender offers serve a "useful purpose in providing a check
on entrenched but inefficient management." '28 In enacting legislation to
promote investor protection, Congress has acknowledged that such legis-
lation may impede some takeovers, but noted that this is "a small price to
pay" for investor protection.
29
The Williams Act530 is the most important federal takeover legisla-
tion. The Williams Act requires specified disclosures by any person
either acquiring five-percent equity ownership of a publicly traded com-
pany 531 or planning a tender offer.5 32 These disclosures include back-
ground information concerning the acquiror; the source, amount and
type of consideration used or to be used in acquiring shares; the purpose
of the purchases; and any major plans or proposals to change the target
lated Commerce Clause by creating impermissible risk of inconsistent regulation among
states); Batus, Inc. v. McKay, 684 F. Supp. 637, 640 (D. Nev. 1988) (Nevada takeover act
violated Commerce Clause because it substantially affected free flow of commerce); TLX Ac-
quisition Corp. v. Telex Corp., 679 F. Supp. 1022, 1029 (W.D. Okla. 1987) (Oklahoma act
violated Commerce Clause by creating impermissible risk of inconsistent regulation of tender
offers and excessive burden on interstate commerce). But see CTS Corp., 481 U.S. at 94 (Indi-
ana takeover statute which requires vote of majority of disinterested target shareholders before
voting rights granted to a potential bidder held valid); Amanda Acquisition Corp. v. Universal
Foods Corp., 708 F. Supp. 984, 1003 (E.D. Wis. 1989) (Wisconsin act did not violate Com-
merce Clause because it did not impose any greater burden on out-of-state tender offerors than
on similarly situated Wisconsin tender offerors), aff'd, 877 F.2d 496 (7th Cir.), cert. denied,
110 S. Ct. 367 (1989); BNS Inc., 683 F. Supp. at 473 (Delaware act extends to constitutional
limits). See generally Note, Sword or Shield The Impact of Third-Generation State Takeover
Statutes on Shareholder Wealth, 57 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 958 (1989); Note, State Regulation of
Corporate Takeovers: Legislation After CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp of America, 18 Sw. U.L.
REv. 155 (1988); Note, The Constitutionality of State Takeover Legislation Revisited: The Ef-
fect of CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of America, 1988 UTAH L. REv. 675.
526. H.R. REP. No. 1711, 90th Cong., 2nd Sess. 2-4, reprinted in 1968 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS 2811, 2813. See also Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc., 430 U.S. 1, 26-28
(1977).
527. Piper, 430 U.S. at 29 ("Congress was indeed committed to a policy of neutrality in
contests for control").
528. H.R. REP., supra note 526, at 2813.
529. Id.
530. Act of July 29, 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-439, 83 Stat. 454 (codified as amended at 15
U.S.C. §§ 78m(d)-(e), 78n(d)-(f) (1988)). The Williams Act, amending the Securities Ex-
change Act of 1934, was enacted in response to the increasing use of tender offers to acquire
control. H.R. REP., supra note 526, at 2811-12. Prior to enactment of the Williams Act,
proxy contest disclosures were strictly regulated, and a bidder could seek control through a
tender offer in "almost complete secrecy." Id. at 2812.
531. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(d), 78n(d) (1988); 17 C.F.R. § 240.13d (1989).
532. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d (1989).
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company's business or corporate structure.53 3
More recently, the SEC, pursuant to a congressional grant of au-
thority, 53 4 enacted the "All-Holders"535 and "Best-Price ' 5 36 rules. The
"All-Holders" rule requires that all tender offers be "open to all security
holders of the class of securities subject to the tender offer."' 537 The best
price rule requires that "[t]he consideration paid to any security holder
• .. [be] the highest consideration paid to any other security holder
.... 538 The SEC clearly states that these rules are designed not to
prohibit tender offers, but to protect shareholders faced with an option to
tender.5 9 The proposed legislation is consistent with federal regulation
and is proposed to fill a gap in shareholder protection that is not ade-
quately secured through state statutes or common law. Therefore, the
legislation will be more effective at the federal rather than the state level.
B. Proposed Legislation
The author proposes the following amendment to the Williams Act
in order to protect shareholders in publicly traded companies. This legis-
lation is designed to preempt state regulation of takeovers to the extent
state law confficts with the shareholder protection purposes of this
amendment but it is not otherwise designed to interfere with state corpo-
rate law.
SECTION 1:
Upon receipt of an unwanted all-shares offer, the board of directors shall
delegate to a "special committee' '54° the responsibility of determining the
validity of the offer.
A. BIDDER'S RESPONSIBILITIES
533. Id. §§ 240.13d-101 Schedule 13D, 240.14d-100 Schedule 14 D-1.
534. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 78c(b), 78m(e), 78n(d), 78n(e), 78n(a) (1989). See also Amendments
to Tender Offer Rules-All-Holders & Best-Price, Securities Act Release No. 6653, [1985-
1986 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) q 84,016, at 88,189 (Sept. 4, 1986) ("[t]he all-
holders and best-price rules are 'necessary or appropriate' to implement the Williams Act").
535. 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.14d-10(a), 240.13e-4(f) (1989).
536. Id. §§ 240.13e-4(f)(8)(ii), 240.14d-10(a)(2).
537. Id. §§ 240.14d-10(a)(1), 13e-4(f). Under this rule, Unocal's exclusion of Mesa from its
self tender offer would have been invalid. See supra notes 133-61 and accompanying text for a
discussion of Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985).
538. 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.13e-4(f)(8)(ii), 14d-10(a)(2) (1988).
539. Securities Act Release No. 6653, supra note 534, at 88,189 (the purpose is to "ensur[e]
that all [shareholders] of the class subject to the tender offer receive information necessary to
make an informed decision").
540. See supra notes 429-30 and accompanying text for a discussion of the use of special
committees to alleviate board conflict problems.
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1. Bidder shall submit to the special committee all material information
regarding the Bidder's identity, purpose, means of financing, and
other material information.
2. Until the special committee has determined that adequate financing
is reasonably secured by Bidder, Bidder shall not publicly solicit
shareholders.541
3. If the special committee has determined that adequate financing is
reasonably secured, Bidder shall prepare a proposed plan reflecting
the anticipated managerial and financial changes in the target's
business.
a. In the case of apartial tender offer, Bidder's proposed plan must
disclose the pro rata consideration and its composition assuming
all shareholders desire to tender. 42
4. Any information given to shareholders from Bidder or from target
shall be subject to the anti-fraud provisions prescribed by the SEC.
5 4 3
B. TARGET MANAGEMENT'S RESPONSIBILITIES
1. If the special committee concludes that adequate financing is se-
cured by Bidder, target management shall prepare and submit the
following to the special committee:
a.. Its proposed plan to defend against the unwanted Bidder.
(1) This plan shall be designed for the benefit of shareholders
and shall not serve as a management-entrenchment device.
b. A reasonably supportable strategic plan demonstrating the likeli-
hood of current management's ability to provide an equivalent
or superior return to shareholders within a reasonable time
period.
(1) A "reasonably supportable plan" is one based on assump-
tions which are objectively verifiable by independent experts,
such as accountants, investment bankers or appraisers.
(2) A "reasonable time period" shall not exceed three years.
(3) Management's plan shall include the cost and financing re-
strictions of its proposed defense plan.5"
541. In order for financing to be reasonably secured, the Bidder should receive financial
commitments from banks or other sources.
542. This requirement may reduce the desirability of Bidder's offer because the cash pre-
mium would be less per share. But it will also eliminate potential coercion by assuring equal
consideration to all shareholders. See supra notes 86-98 and accompanying text for a discus-
sion of the procedural coercion present in some bids.
543. See 15 U.S.C. § 78(l) (1982).
544. "Financing restrictions" includes debt covenants, such as limitations on dividends, fu-
ture indebtedness or future investment. See, for example, TIME WARNER 10-Q, supra note
377, at 8. This provision is designed to demonstrate the effect on the target company of financ-
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(4) Management's projections shall include a discount factor
which takes into account:
a. the likelihood that projected returns will not be realized,
and
b. the time value of money.
2. Any information given to shareholders from Bidder or from target
shall be subject to the anti-fraud provisions prescribed by the SEC.
C. SPECIAL COMMITTEE'S RESPONSIBILITIES
1. The special committee is initially responsible for determining
whether Bidder has reasonably secured adequate financing.
2. If Bidder has reasonably secured adequate financing, the special
committee shall review the plans submitted by both Bidder and
management.
a. The special committee shall then consult with independent ex-
perts to verify assumptions and conclusions in management's
and Bidder's plans.
5 45
b. Any expert consulted shall have access to all material informa-
tion concerning target and Bidder, which is reasonably required
to make an objective evaluation.
3. Target and Bidder proposals, expert opinions and a recommendation
by the special committee, shall then be submitted to target
shareholders.
a. The special committee recommendation shall include: (1) a
summary of the rationale for its conclusion; (2) its evaluation of
the degree of threat posed by each competing offer; and (3) the
potential financial benefit inuring to current management, if any,
under management's proposed plan.
D. SHAREHOLDER VOTE
1. Shareholders shall then have a reasonable time to evaluate informa-
tion submitted and vote.546
a. Each share shall count as one vote.
47
ing a defense plan either by depleting existing cash earmarked for other purposes or by selling
debt. See Lipton I, supra note 89, at 23-24.
545. This provision avoids the temptation of directors' "rubber stamping" management's
proposal. Such "rubber stamping" was invalidated in Edelman v. Fruehauf Corp., 798 F.2d
882, 885-86 (6th Cir. 1986).
546. Variations of shareholder voting rights have been proposed. See, e.g., Bebchuck, To-
ward Undistorted Choice and Equal Treatment in Corporate Takeovers, 98 HARV. L. REV.
1695, 1752-64 (1985); Lipton I, supra note 89, at 62-63.
547. The author considered the exclusion of shares held by management and Bidder, as is
the case with the Indiana "control share" statute upheld by the Supreme Court of the United
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b. The plan receiving the greatest number of shareholder votes
shall be implemented by the Board of Directors under the gui-
dance of the special committee.
SECTION 2:
Boards of directors shall not adopt plans to deter or prevent an unwanted
takeover when no takeover threat is posed unless so decided by a share-
holder majority vote.
1. Plans designed to deter or prevent an unwanted takeover threat in-
clude, but are not limited to the following:
a. poison pills, 548 and
b. golden parachutes.
5 49
2. For purposes of such shareholder vote, each share shall count as one
vote.
VI. CONCLUSION
Corporate takeovers can be beneficial to individual shareholders and
to the national economy. However, takeovers may also be coercive at-
tempts to force shareholders to tender their shares or to harm the corpo-
rate enterprise. Corporate directors, though serving an important
function in managing the business and affairs of companies, may not ade-
quately serve shareholder interests. Directors faced with corporate con-
trol decisions should not enjoy the same deference afforded them in other
business judgment decisions because the outcome of a control decision
will unavoidably affect the directors personally.
Regulation of corporate control decisions is necessary to protect
shareholders from coercive bids and to ensure efficient utilization of eco-
nomic assets. Attempts by states to regulate tender offers have been inef-
fective in ensuring shareholder protection and may not be
constitutionally permissible because of the significant effect takeovers
States in CTS v. Dynamics Corp. of Am., 481 U.S. 69 (1987), but concluded that a bidder
should be able to vote in its best interest.
548. See supra note 76. Although poison pills can serve as a useful negotiating tool when a
truly coercive offer is proposed, they may preclude valuable shareholder opportunities that
may arise in the future. Therefore, implementation of a poison pill may result in improper
management entrenchment. See also Dynamics Corp. of Am. v. CTS Corp., 794 F.2d 250,
254-55 (7th Cir. 1986), rev'd on other grounds, 481 U.S. 69 (1987).
549. See supra note 76. This provision is not meant to proscribe fair and reasonable sever-
ance contracts with loyal and long-standing employees awarded to commend outstanding ser-
vice to the company. The propriety of golden parachute plans has recently come under
increasing scrutiny. See Salwen, Ruling by SEC May Threaten Parachute Plans, Wall St. J.,
Jan. 18, 1990, at A3, col. 4 (SEC required Transamerica Corp. to submit its proposed golden
parachute plan to shareholder vote).
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have on dispersed shareholders."' Federal legislation has sought to pro-
vide shareholder protection and to ensure fairness in the takeover mar-
ket; however, as currently applied, it is inadequate. The proposed federal
legislation is designed to protect shareholders from truly coercive offers,
while allowing shareholders to exercise their full voting power. Amend-
ing the Williams Act with such legislation will balance director discre-
tion and shareholder protection and will further the Williams Act
shareholder protection purposes. 5
Carol Seidler*
550. See, e.g., Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624 (1982); Tyson Foods, Inc. v. McReyn-
olds, 865 F.2d 99 (6th Cir. 1989); Campeau Corp. v. Federated Dep't Stores, 679 F. Supp. 735
(S.D. Ohio 1988). See also supra notes 521-25 and accompanying text.
551. See supra notes 526-33 and accompanying text.
* The author wishes to thank Professor Therese Maynard and Professor Kathryn Tate
for their enthusiasm for this topic and for their comments on earlier drafts. The author also
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